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ABSTRACT
This case study investigated the experiences of engineers in the U.S. defense industry. The
research identified two engineers that demonstrated phronesis, or practical wisdom, that sets
them apart from their peers. These defense engineers demonstrated exemplary selflessness and
ability to navigate the murky moral path while facing personal and professional hardships. In the
end, regardless of their right actions and good outcome, they are neither recognized nor rewarded
due to various industry and business forces. I call them unsung hero engineers and link their
ideas and action to phronesis. This study documents their experiences, their ideas, and the
outcomes. I also capture the history and current condition of the defense industry and describe
the defense engineering work environment. This case study applies various theoretical lenses
including Flybjerg’s phronesis, Bourdieu’s logic of practice, and Goffman’s moral career. The
result is a rich study in the experiences of defense engineers and how they navigate the defense
business, careers, and personal growth.
Keywords: Phronesis, Moral Career, professional reputation, Habitus, total institution,
defense engineer.
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INTRODUCTION
My name is Chandrakant Madhav. I am a senior project engineer for a major defense
contractor named ACME (a pseudonym) located in North City (a pseudonym) in the Midwest
region of U.S.A. I have over 30 years of work experience with increasing responsibility in the
industry and the last 22 years with ACME North (a pseudonym). My career with ACME North
is very fulfilling and exciting with numerous opportunities to participate in cutting-edge
engineering. This business unit of ACME, with its 500 employees, has provided me numerous
opportunities to transition between engineering and management. As a member of the
management team, I have gained many administration, organization, and management skills.
However, I prefer engineering work and get considerable personal fulfillment from product
design and development. I am presently on the engineering side of the business as an Integrated
Product Team (IPT) Lead Systems Engineer for a medium-sized program.
The best parts of engineering are the technical and organizational challenges. I love
solving all kinds of problems. I often take on festering issues that are ignored or are deemed
unsolvable by others. I have had many successes at conducting both technical and management
investigations. Some of my investigations and product development activities have led to
additional new business for ACME North.
This study was originally about the on-going relationship between two business units of
ACME. However, the data revealed two engineers with exceptional ability contribute to the
well-being of others in the system and thereby transcending their scientific backgrounds and
training. This is a phronetic analysis of these two engineers that navigate the field and habitus of
their chosen careers. Simply, phronesis is the application of moral wisdom and the analysis of
value with power. I further explain phronesis and habitus in Chapter 1.
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I call them “hero engineers” and will document how they navigate the system,
encounter hardship, overcome obstacles, and forge creative solutions to improve the humancondition of their fellow engineers regardless of recognition and rewards. They are unsung
heroes. To provide context, I will also describe the history and the environmental condition that
supports the rise of these hero engineers.
Before I describe the topic, I will provide some background. ACME, like most defense
companies in the last 30 years, has undergone significant consolidation due to reduced defense
funding. One such consolidation was the 1995 acquisition of a Navy base located in South City
(a pseudonym) of South State (a pseudonym). This purchase was part of a negotiated deal
between ACME and the U.S. government during a time when defense reductions were being
implemented through Navy base consolidations and closures. The deal required Congressional
support and was facilitated by South State’s senior senator who is a long-standing member of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, the umbrella for defense appropriation. These sister business
units, ACME North and ACME South (a pseudonym), though intricately linked and symbiotic,
seem to have a discordant relationship. Management has tried various ways to improve this
relationship between the two business units without success.
I have been aware of this dysfunction between the two business units for a long time
and have personally experienced the negative consequences of this clash. Over time, this
relationship has worsened. The causes for these hostilities are complex, but I believe that
changing from being competitors to sister business units through mergers and acquisitions,
inadequate leadership, and insufficient time to adjust to one another may be contributing factors.
These acrimonious relationships are not uncommon in defense industry corporations
and are possibly the result of corporate changes brought about by industry instability. A lot of
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what is happening between the two ACME two business units is an indicator for the rest of the
industry. When collaborating with other on projects, I have personally experienced similar
business relationship issues at other corporations where sister business units seem to also have
contentious relationships. This case study also provides a glimpse in the inner-workings of a
typical defense engineering company.
It is with this relationship as the background that I capture the actions and experiences of
two hero engineers. These heroes take it upon themselves to improve the relationship between
the two divisions. I have known one of them for over 22 years and had numerous interactions
prior to and during this study. The other I had known only through reputation prior to this study.
This was a multidimensional study of these individuals using two projects and the relationship
between the business units as background. I was not directly involved in these projects but was
privy to all that was going on in my position as a manager and project engineer.
This research also provided a glimpse into the work of a defense engineer, how work is
accomplished in the industry, and the relationship between defense businesses and government.
This study provides some insight into the defense industry; an oft misaligned and misunderstood
but politically-powerful industry.
There are many quantitative studies on the industry by private and government
organizations but few that provide information on these kinds of relationship issues. There are
also few holistic views of the industry and even fewer studies on defense engineers. Qualitative
analyses of the industry are rare and a neglected part of the contemporary defense industry. I
hope to share my insider experience that has provided a unique understanding of the industry. I
hope this study influences the debate on national defense and defense expenditure.
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
Where science does not reach, art, literature, and narrative often help us
comprehend the reality in which we live.
- Bent Flyvbjerg (2008)
Section 1: Relevant Topical Literature
This section begins with the history of the defense industry and how the industry came
about in the 1950s. I will present the history of defense spending and evaluate the impact of
downsizing on defense contractors, soldiers, and defense industry employees. The defense
business is a complex, specialized field, with many players and participants.
History of the Military Industrial Complex
From the War of 1812 to World War II, government military arsenals produced almost all
of the weapons and ordnance used by the U.S. armed forces. This setup was fine until the
capabilities of these arsenals were deemed limited during the massive arms buildup during
World War II. The government had no choice but to solicit the private industry to help meet the
war’s demands for massive quantities of military equipment. To meet this demand, the bulk of
the US weapon production shifted to private, for-profit companies (Watts & Harrison, 2011).
At the end of World War II, the U.S. government held title to a significant portion of the
country’s industrial base including 90% of the synthetic rubber, aircraft, and magnesium
industries and over 50% of the aluminum and machine tool industries (Kapstein, 1993). These
assets needed to be transferred to the private sector through a process of conversion. Some were
easy to convert; others were a downright failure leading to the dumping of billions of dollars’
worth of machine tools in the ocean and rebuilding the economy anew (Minnich, 1993).
After WWII, two significant events brought about the permanency of the military
industrial complex. The first event was the Southeast Asia conflicts of Korea and Vietnam that
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further demanded continued support from for-profit defense activities. The second event was the
start of the Cold War (Watts, 2008). By the mid-1950s, the defense industrial complex had
become a permanent part of our economy.
Over time, more and more of the production of weapons was transferred to the private
sector. This process continues today with outright base closures or transfer of assets to for-profit
corporations. There are many reasons why government arsenals were ill-equipped to serve the
needs of our nation. The weapons were becoming more complex requiring large-scale
collaboration between science, technology, and manufacturing. These were easily supplied by
the various private engineering firms, universities and production companies. This was also the
onset of the Cold War and nuclear arms were the dominant weapon of development and
production. The arsenals were also very slow to respond to the changing environment and hubris
from their previous monopoly had led to significant inefficiencies. The shift from arsenals to
private defense, or the policy of economic conversion, helped solidify defense contracting. A
peacetime defense industry had become a permanent feature of the U.S. economy continuing
even after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Watts & Harrison, 2011).
President Dwight Eisenhower, during his farewell address to the nation on January 18,
1961, called attention to the "conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms
industry." And warned that "in the councils of government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist"
(Eisenhower, 1961).
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Contemporary Industry Description
The U.S. defense industry is a significant factor in the American economy and in the
nation’s strategic posture. The industry is funded by Congress through the Pentagon. The
Pentagon is responsible for coordinating and managing all the various branches of the armed
forces including defense acquisition.
In 2012, the Pentagon obligated approximately $360 Billion for goods and services
including major weapon systems, information technology, professional and administrative
support, weapons systems and base maintenance, and office supplies. Of this, approximately
70% went to the development and production of weapon systems (GAO Report, 2013). This
industry employs about one-third of all American scientists, one-fifth of all engineers, and close
to one-tenth of the manufacturing labor force (Gansler, 1986). In the next section, I will describe
the industry and various strategies available for contracting with defense companies.
Industry makeup. So far we have considered defense contractors as a cohesive and
influential group. However, the industry is not a homogeneous group and is made up of various
sectors. To best describe the industry, I will consider them segregated into prime contractors,
second tier, and small suppliers. The top ten “primes” or giants of the industry have recently
been Lockheed Martin, Boeing, ACME (USA), General Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrup
Grumman, L-3 Communications, United Technologies, SAIC, and Huntington Ingalls Shipyard.
These giants took in close to a third of all Pentagon allocations with the rest going to wars,
soldiers and civilian personnel salaries, office and computer supplies, pensions, and
soldier/veteran health care. These primes are paid to not only develop, integrate, and deliver the
product but also to manage and coordinate subcontractors and suppliers. They have tremendous
capabilities in labor, facilities, and know-how to bring complex weapons to market. These
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primes have total control of the market, and the Pentagon does not bypass them for any large
contracts. Most are specialized in their area of expertise, and they ferociously guard their turf.
They have multiple business units and - except for Boeing which has both commercial and
military products - defense is their only business focus. These primes rarely compete with each
other for contracts and more often collaborate through agreements, work-share, and joint
partnerships. They also have a significant lobbying presence in Washington D.C. at corporate
and industry levels. All have retired military leaders working for them or on their boards of
control.
The second tier is made up of major corporations that provide specialized products and
materials used by the giants in the development of weapon systems. These are computer,
services, and technology providers such as high-tech engineering tools and specialized highreliability electronics and software. These second tier companies usually provide services and
equipment to the primes. There is some competition within the second tier. The primes manage
these subcontractors with tough negotiations and fixed price contracts. Often, these companies
have a combined defense and commercial application. There is some volatility in the fortunes of
these companies since there is an ongoing leap-frogging for new technologies and newer
materials.
The lowest tier, also the least powerful group in the industry, is made up of small
companies that provide parts and equipment for both commercial and military needs. They deal
with fixed price contracts with the primes and second tiers and are in a highly competitive and
volatile market. The primes and subcontractors often flow down contractual language from
Pentagon making it more expensive to manage and difficult to make a profit. There are many
small firms that compete for this business and they provide cheaper, mass-produced products and
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services. They have to satisfy accounting, safety, and quality audits in order to become an
approved supplier; however, becoming an approved supplier does not guarantee work (Gansler,
1986). Though there are “small-business” clauses in defense contracts that are intended to direct
work to small and disadvantaged businesses, these clauses are usually poorly written and rarely
enforced. The prime contractors have also developed various ways to bypass these clauses by
linking them to cost increase, poor quality, and schedule delays. A summary of the various
differences between the various sectors is provided in Table 1 (see Table 1). This table,
constructed from my personal experience in the defense industry and Ganlser (1986), also
includes government owned military arsenals as a sector to comprehensively show disparity in
the defense industry (Watts & Harrison, 2011).
Purchase and Acquisition Strategies
The Pentagon has two methods of purchasing services and weapons from contractors.
The Level of Effort (LOE) method is where Pentagon pays all the accrued development and
production costs through full labor, services, and material cost reimbursement contracts. LOE,
also called cost-plus contract, allows the contractor to charge the total cost of parts and labor, and
a pre-agreed profit percentage. In some cases, there is an incentive bonus (called award fee) that
is also given to the contractor based on meeting cost, quality, and schedule targets. The alternate
is called the fixed-price contract. This method forces the contractor to set a ceiling price for the
product/ services and costs above and beyond the ceiling would be contractor responsibility.
Though this may seem like a benefit for the Pentagon, most contractors estimate a higher ceiling
price to ensure profit even in the worst of conditions. Neither of these two methods is a cost
saver for the tax payer (Harrison, 2012b).
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Table 1. Defense Industry Sector Comparison (* Original analysis as informed
by Gansler (1986))*
Characteristic

Military Arsenal

Prime(s)

Medium Tier

Low Tier

Low

High

High

High-Med

Profit Margins

N/A – Not a
profit making
enterprise

High

Med

Low

Contract Type
(Typical)

Full funding for
personnel and
equipment

Level of Effort
(LOE)

Fixed Price

Fixed Price

Efficiency

Low

Med

High

Business
Capability

Few low-tech
products

Few high-tech,
complex products

Technology to
support multiple
industries

High
Technology or
manpower to
support multiple
industries

Govt owned

Private

Private

Private

High

Med

Low

Low

Typical
Company/Org

Rock Island
Arsenal,
Redstone
Arsenal

Lockheed Martin,
Raytheon,
Boeing, ACME

Kaman Aircraft,
Motorola,
Teledyne

Circuit card
makers, machine
ships, assembly
houses

Market Type

Closed

Closed

Mainly Closed

Open

High-Tech

Private/Govt
Owned
Overhead Cost

Competition Structuring
The Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires the department of Defense (DoD) to use
acquisition strategies that “ensure competition or the option for competition, at both the prime
contract level and subcontract level”. The law goes on to identify competitive prototyping and
dual or multi sourcing as measures to ensure competition (Harrison, 2012b). Increasing
competition may actually increase the overall cost because Pentagon would have to fund
multiple contractors for design, development, and/or production. And, the fewer number of
items produced by each contractor would not provide cost benefits.
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To satisfy proponents of competition, the Pentagon attempted to create competition by
two main means: Multi-sourcing development and then “down-selecting” (or awarding the
contract) to a single producer; or single sourcing the development and then getting multiple
producers. Down-select is the process of evaluating multiple developers and awarding the
production contract to only one of them. Neither multi-sourcing nor single-sourcing are perfect
means of buying weapons. Multi-sourcing requires two or more contractors to work on the same
weapon to create an opportunity for competition. In these cases, the Pentagon must pay (directly
or indirectly) for two or more contractors to develop the same system. This redundant work adds
to the overall program cost.
Similarly, if the Pentagon were to down-select to the best production contractor after
multiple development contractors, this would effectively end competition and grant the winner a
monopoly for future procurements of the same system. On the other hand, if there was one
development contractor and multiple production contractors (a “build to print” approach), the
Pentagon must still pay for the development of more than one production line (Harrison, 2012b).
Either way, the Pentagon does not win.
Mergers, Consolidations and Takeovers
The defense business is a cyclical market and defense contractors (should) have the
means to adjust to changing environment (Udis, 1993). In times of funding increase, they take
on employees and easily shed them during tightening markets. Over time, these ups and downs
have shown to be predictable with cycle time of about 20 years (about 10 years up, 10 years
down) or “long wave” patterns (Kapstein, 1993). In order to adjust to these cycles, defense
contractors buy and sell businesses, start new businesses, consolidate, shut-down, and merge
with other defense contractors as tactics to remain viable and profitable.
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The best way to reduce competition in the industry is to buy out the competition, combine
this acquisition with existing business and then shed any redundancies. During industry
downturns, these buying and selling are even more prevalent since many corporations are
looking to consolidate, sell-off redundancies, and find opportunities that other defense
contractors may want to shed. Unfortunately, the brunt of the downturns and industry
reconstitutions are usually felt by the workers due to reduced wages, pressures to increase
productivity, unpredictable futures, increased worker to worker competitions, and cycles of
layoffs.
The present defense industry has become very streamlined, and as a result maintains only
minimal physical capital, human skills, manufacturing, and research organizations needed to
produce new weapons. This continued industry reconstitution implies that long-term plans
(greater than 10 to 20 years) become redundant since contractor capabilities may not be available
when desired (Blair, 1993) and corporations are not willing to hold on capabilities that are not
currently producing income.
Defense Spending
Defense spending is an ongoing debate in our society. Some feel it is taking up too much
of our federal budget whereas others ask for more to be spent in this area. The numbers support
both sides depending on evidence used. Tracking the year-to-year spending, one would see
increases due to adjustments for inflation. On the other hand, tracking spending as a percent of
Gross National Product (GDP) shows the spending peak in World War II at 6.3% of GDP and
post-Sequestration spending at less than 4% (Harrison, 2011).
U.S. military services and the defense industry have undergone major changes since
World War II (Watts, 2008) and have experienced four major cycles of rise and fall in budget
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allocations to defense. These four cycles are the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Reagan
Buildup, and Homeland Security. Homeland Security also includes the ongoing wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The overall defense budget as well as the allocation to various components of the budget
over the last half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first is shown in
Figure 1 (see figure 1). Of particular interest is the approximate 30% reduction in appropriations
funding after the Reagan buildup in the mid-1980s. This significant reduction led to additional
Navy base consolidations and closures and the privatization of a Navy arsenal which is now
ACME South.

Figure 1. Defense Department Total Obligational Authority (TOA)
(In constant FY2009 dollars (Watts, 2008))
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This chart provides details up to 2004. After that, the overall budget continuously rose
only to come to a downturn in January 2013 due to automatic budget cuts (not shown). These
cuts were commonly called Sequestration. At peak, the 2012 defense budget (including the two
war allocations) came to approximately $703B (Harrison, 2011) including a base budget of
$553B. In 2013, due to Sequestration, the base budget was cut by 10.3% (or $54B) leading to
the overall budget of approximately $570B. For follow-on years and as of the period of this
research, Sequestration is expected to produce an annual reduction of $54B. This implies that
defense budgets are in decline for the foreseeable future.
Of particular interest to this study is the post-Reagan Defense downturn that occurred
between 1992 and 2002. In 1995 the U.S. Navy base located in South City was privatized by the
U.S. Navy with Congressional support. This privatization led to the purchase by ACME. This
case study concerns this era’s implications as played out at ACME. In the next section, I will
further discuss the funding environment that covers the era between 2004 and present.
Impact on Defense Contractors, Soldiers, and Defense Workers
According to Harrison (2012a), military personnel and procurement took the largest cuts
in 2013. The majority of these procurement dollars are usually allocated to defense contractors
for ongoing product development and purchase of new weapons. As of 2013, the winding down
of military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan was expected to add additional pressures for further
reductions. These cuts have significantly impacted defense companies and have led to plant
closures, consolidations, and layoffs. In previous defense down-turns, the rest of the economy
was on the upswing and easily absorbed unemployed soldiers and defense workers (Kapstein,
1993). Additionally, layoffs due to downturn could impact a defense industry worker regardless
of reputation.
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However, with the lingering effects of the Great Recession and anticipated low GDP
growth, the industry and government would seem to be facing a major predicament. This latest
cycle of reduction is not expected to yield any savings or “peace dividend” because the defense
build-up since the 1980s and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are funded by borrowed monies,
not tax revenues. Therefore, any “saving” would automatically go to pay down the debt and not
be available for other government programs such as unemployment benefits and worker
retraining (Brinner, 1993).
As mentioned before, the employment impact of previous defense spending downturns
was circumvented as a thriving economy and supporting credit easing policy of economic
stimulus (Kapstein, 1993) easily absorbed the defense layoffs. However, the defense spending
downturn of 2013 may cause a prolong drag on the U.S. economy since the rest of the economy
remains in a slump and the Federal Reserve, in an attempt to control the impact of the recession,
has exhausted all avenues for stimuli. Kapstein (1993) estimates the continued downturn in the
defense industry would multiply throughout the remainder economy to losses of about two-andone-half times the direct reduction – for every dollar of lower defense spending, there would be
approximately $1.50 lost in consumer retail sales. In the next section, I will discuss the idea of
free market and its applicability to the defense industry.
Defense Procurement as a Closed Market
Business dealings within the U.S. economy are usually perceived to be and are generally
desired to be part of the free-market system. However, the defense industry deviates widely
from the conventional wisdom of free market theory (Gansler, 1986). Recent quantitative
studies such as one by Rundquist and Carsey (2002) and the continued monitoring of the
industry by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (General Accounting Office Report,

PHRONESIS IN DEFENSE ENGINEERING

21

1998; General Accounting Office Report, 2013) tend to focus on pork barrel spending rather than
consider the possible issues with the overall industry structure. We see a different picture if we
evaluate the defense industry using the framework of a true free-market lens. For example, to
return to Table 1 (see Table 1), it provides a summary of the various parts of the defense industry
and their relative “openness.” Simply, the primes and arsenals do not completely function as
part of the free market because there is only one customer, one or few suppliers of the desired
system, and entry into the market is difficult.
Free-market system - The invisible hand. According to Gansler (1986), a free market has a
tendency to regulate itself by means of competition, supply and demand, and self-interest. Adam
Smith called this phenomenon the invisible hand. Generally, a free market is made up of many
buyers, many sellers, and prices set by the market (Muller, 1993). A free market works by
responding to changes in supply and demand. There are large quantities involved over many
transactions that help limit profits. Over time, the iterative relationship between production cost,
profits, and competition brings about a stability and downward trend in price, commonly called
equilibrium. The existence of a free market does not completely eliminate the need for
government since it is necessary as a forum for determining the rules of the game and as an
umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on (Freidman, 1962).
In a free market, the government has limited involvement in setting up a forum for
determining the “rules of the game,” ensuring safety, and to “umpire the game” to interpret and
enforce the rules decided on; but has no connection with setting the price, quality, or quantity
levels (Antonio, 2003). The system provides barrier-free movement in and out of the market.
Free markets also have a built-in risk that competition will take away your market share if they
have a better or cheaper product (Gansler, 1986).
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Free-market system - The invisible foot. The U.S. defense industry is not a traditional free
market with many buyers and many sellers and limited regulations. According to Harrison
(2012b), the industry can best be described as a “monopsony” with the U.S. government as the
sole customer and chief regulator. There are possible other foreign customers but in all cases,
these sales are significantly smaller, highly regulated, restricted to a few allied countries, and
with technology strictly controlled by the U.S. government. Also, there are a limited number of
vendors capable of producing the weapon systems – just one or two primes in some sectors.
“In these instances, the defense industry is a monopsony-duopoly [two vendors] or a bilateral monopoly [one vendor] [and not a free market] (Harrison, 2012b). According to Bowles
and Edwards (1993), the condition that brings about a failed free-market is call the invisible foot.
Hence the title of this subsection. However, the monopsony characteristics at play in the defense
industry are not entirely altruistic.
The defense industry is highly regulated and Pentagon acts as a regulator, bank, product
specifier, and judge of claim (Gansler, 1986). Likewise, Entry to the defense industry at all
levels is very restrictive. Entry requires demonstrated capability and adherence and history with
required regulations. These activities would require significant resources just to prepare to put in
a contract bid. Additional regulations such as buy-American (at any cost, schedule, or quality),
OSHA, and EEO also come into play (Gansler, 1986) and would require a new player to heavily
invest in personnel and infrastructure without any guarantee of contract award. Even so, for a
new company without any history on the product, it would be impossible for the Pentagon to
award a contract (Rundquist & Carsey, 2002).
In addition, defense products have a reverse price-to-demand relationship. In a freemarket system the prices will fall when the demand is reduced but in the defense industry prices
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rise when the demand is reduced. Put another way, regardless of demand prices are always
rising in defense economics. Additionally, the cost is not directly incurred by Pentagon or
Congress since it is the U.S. taxpayers who foot the bill and price controlling is counterproductive for Congress and the Pentagon since it would mean less money under their control.
Likewise, the prime defense contractors face no risk with cost plus or fixed price contracting.
In defense of the defense industry. Why does the industry believe that this is the best business
model to achieve their needs for equipment and services? The Pentagon looks to manage the
industry by requiring the defense contractors to be self-sufficient, with excess capacity in times
of need, and a constant demand for weapons for the future. However, the reality of the
procurement system is far from this idealistic scenario. Contractors are set up with an implied
promise for purchase of their products but, the Pentagon is fickle. It has been known to reduce
number of units or outright cancel on-going programs. This behavior greatly impacts a
contractor’s ability to predict and manage business cycles. These contractual upheavals are so
pervasive that industry members already have a built-in method of using historic basis of
estimates for future contracts.
Defense legislation has always attempted to achieve “fairness” by providing for a
uniform procurement practice. However, the defense industry is so diverse that rote application
of uniform government policies seem to lead to additional undesirable performance and costs.
Also, the “fairness” theory and the federal regulations say that competition should be a required
norm for the business; however, most defense-contractor money is awarded on a sole-source
basis, and less than 8% is awarded on the basis of price competition (Gansler, 1986). These
regulations, established with free-market assumptions, are unlikely to improve efficiency and
have often made things worst (Watts & Harrison, 2011).
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It should also be agreed that truly free market designation is most characteristic of
cheaper and mass produced consumable items; often at the back end of their marginal profits.
Cutting edge products in the defense industry are often closely guarded; and likely operating
within a quasi-monopoly environment. Complex weapons are much more like the latter than the
former. They take significant time (seven to ten years in some cases) to develop and
manufacture (Gansler, 1986). Thus, the defense industry is more a niche market in which freemarket principles are inappropriate.
In defense of the Pentagon. Why does the Pentagon constantly walk a fine line between their
weaponry needs and its ability to satisfy the laws and regulations? In attempting competition,
they have been burned by high costs, non-delivery, and poor quality products because these
products take too long to develop and produce and, due to the changing environment, become
redundant before they reach production. Therefore, Pentagon attempts to do the best it can to
meet their mandate in an environment of limited and fluctuating funds as well as conflicting
interests between the Pentagon, the contractors, and the U.S. legislature (which funds Pentagon
activities). Simply, this is one step better than government owned arsenals building weapons like
in our history and what presently happens in Russia.
This industry is not a homogeneous set, and not all members benefit from the established
method of weapons procurement. As mentioned before, the legislated need for “fairness” (by
providing for a uniform procurement practice) hinders the Pentagon by adding additional levels
of bureaucracy at the agency and limiting the agency’s ability to react quickly to changing
circumstances.
According to Watts and Harrison (2011), fundamental decisions about what weapons to
develop; priorities to be given to cost, schedule and performance; and the annual funding
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allocation for various weapons programs are the result of complex negotiations. These
negotiations are often politicized interactions between the military service, war-fighting
communities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the office of the secretary of defense, the White House,
and Congress. Additionally, Congress has regulations that force Pentagon to spend allocated
funds or lose funding at the end of the fiscal year. This “use or lose” method often creates a false
need. Likewise, Congress has the ability to “up” specific weapons allocation depending on
where they are developed and produced, regardless of need. Unlike a free-market, the size of the
market is neither fully established by Pentagon (the buyer) or the defense industry (the seller) but
is highly susceptible to alteration by third parties such as Congress, the White House, and
lobbyists (Gansler, 1986).
So how does the defense market work overall? According to Gansler (1986), “the theory
of second best” should be applied. This theory states that if some conditions of the traditional
free market (“the first best”) do not apply and cannot be created, then the degree of deviation
from the free market will determine the amount of inefficiency and ineffectiveness. The method
of purchasing weapons is suitable to the situation but by no means perfect. Any other methods
of procurement may violate, lower, and expose the country’s military capabilities (keeping
weapons and capabilities as state secrets), and it also compromises the Pentagon’s ability to
manage.
Players and influencers. Based on data from the mid-late 20th Century, Rundquist and Carsey
(2002) demonstrate that there is no clear evidence that defense corporations benefited in any way
from Congressional positions. Their study shows that the defense funding follows technical
expertise. However, the Rundquist and Carsey studies spanned the period when one party, the
Democrats, ruled both the House and the Senate before the resurgence of the Republican led
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Congress during the Reagan era. This meant that the Pentagon “pie” was distributed to a constant
set of states over the period of Democratic control which manifested as “expertise” during the
Rundquist and Carsey Study. Looking at the data after the Republican takeover would probably
show different results.
Research by Lee (2000), in contrast, suggests that the senate’s equal representation of
states (two senators per state regardless of state population) shapes coalition building in
distributive politics. The greater variation in state population means that some states have far
greater need for federal funds than other, but all senators have equal voting weight. As a result,
even though all senators’ votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal
price. Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to
program budgets than comparable benefits to more populous states. The final outcome of
distributive policy more closely reflects the preferences of small-state coalitions than large state
senators.
The Congressional influence on what occurred at ACME South (see Chapter 3) may be
anecdotal evidence; the business unit is heavily supported by South State’s Congressional member
on the Senate Appropriation Committee. This is apparent since South State, a state that was
traditionally in the bottom tier of military expenditures, has moved to the middle tier and continues
to rise since the senator’s appointment to the committee (Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). For
example, in 1996 this privatization was questioned by the GAO and, according to analysis, this
business deal was expected to be more costly to the U.S. government than shutting down the
business and transferring the work to other government arsenals (General Accounting Office,
1998).
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New Public Management to Overcome Good People Trapped in Bad Systems
One possible path forward for the industry is for the Pentagon to continue with further
privatization and adopting new management tools that would align the organization with the
doctrine of New Public Management (NPM). This doctrine claims to offer an all-purpose key to
better provision of public or government services (Hood, 1991). The rise of NPM over the past
35 years is one of the most striking international trends in public administration. This trend
accounts for attempts to slow down or reverse government growth, a shift towards privatization
and semi-privatization, the development of automation, and more inter-government cooperation.
NPM is broadly the set of government policies that are aimed at modernizing government
agencies and public institutions to be more effective (Hood, 1991; Kaboolian, 1998). The
doctrine which is made up of various overlapping precepts, would impact the Pentagon as well as
the defense contractors. For the Pentagon, the focus would be on increasing cost efficiencies by
adopting market-oriented management tactics. NPM would require greater competition, private
sector style management, and disciplined use of resources from the defense contractors.
Some of these reforms are already underway in many U.S. government agencies and
other foreign governments. Though this set of administrative reforms may fade from the scene
in the future, the infusion of market principles into these systems will have a longer lasting effect
(Kaboolian, 1998).
What is NPM? NPM is an amalgamation of two different streams of ideas. One idea is the
“new institutional economics.” This movement helped bring about ideas of contestability, user
choice, transparency, and incentive structures. The other idea is the injection of administrative
reforms and professional management expertise into the public sector for improved
organizational performance and increased output (Hood, 1991). It is beneficial to look at policy
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making, implementation, and delivery as a series of transactions of negotiated contracts
(Kaboolian, 1998).
According the Hood (1991), administrative design can fall into one of three groups based
on the values desired. These groups and corresponding design are provided in Table 2 (see
Table 2). The defense industry aims for Sigma-type NPM values for frugality and managed
inefficiencies. Hood (1991) goes on to say that Sigma-type NPM includes characteristics such as
just-in-time inventory control with expected rapid delivery by suppliers; results based payments;
and low administrative cost.
NPM and the defense industry. It would be prudent to acknowledge that the defense industry
is a complex government-business structure made up of multiple influencers that each could
benefit from selecting their own values from Table 2 (see Table 2). For example, the Pentagon
would probably adapt a Lambda-type NPM that focusses on robustness of defense and the longterm viability to protect and defend the country. Likewise in the interest of political “cover” if
not simple fairness, Congress would target at Theta-type NPM that focusses on honesty and
fairness. Sigma-type NPM would provide for best practice and frugality would be applicable at
individual program level. The Sigma, Theta and Lambda type NPM values are further explained
in Table 2 (see Table 2).
This complexity of the overall defense acquisition system also begs for simplification.
Kaboolian (1998) argues that government agencies reflect politics - and therefore the health and
improvement - of the current administration. Unless there are meaningful changes to the
underlying politics that causes the Pentagon’s role to meaningfully shift towards a purely
customer orientation, these organizations are not allowed to use Sigma-type values.
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Table 2. Three sets of core values in public management (Hood, 1991)
Sigma-type Values
KEEP IT LEAN AND
PURPOSEFUL
Frugality
(matching of resources
to tasks for given goal)

Theta-type values
KEEP IT HONEST
AND FAIR
Rectitude
(achieving of fairness,
mutuality, the proper
discharge of duties)

Lambda-type values
KEEP IT ROBUST
AND RESILIENT
Resilience
(achieving of reliability,
adaptability,
robustness)

STANDARD OF
FAILURE

Waste
(muddle, confusion,
inefficiencies)

Malversation
(unfairness, bias,
abuse of office)

Catastrophe
(risk, breakdown,
collapse)

CURRENCY OF
SUCCESS AND
FAILURE

Money and time
(resource costs of
producers and
consumers)

Trust and entitlement
(consent, legitimacy,
does process, political
entitlement)

Security and
survivability
(confidence, life, and
limb)

CONTROL
EMPHASIS

Output

Process

Input/Process

SLACK

Low

Medium

High

GOALS

Fixed/Single

Incompatible
‘Double bind’

Emergent/Multiple

INFORMATION

Cost, segmented
(Commercial assets)

Structured

Rich exchange,
collective assets

COUPLING

Tight

Medium

Loose

STANDARD OF
SUCCESS

Applying the NPM characteristics set in table 2 (see table 2), one can notice that the
ACME North may have a false understanding of the ACME South’s core values. Having
survived major industry upheavals and corporate changes, ACME South is a Lambda-type (Keep
it robust and resilient) whereas ACME North may have wanted them to be a Sigma Type (Keep
it lean and purposeful). ACME South’s core values are in their very makeup and may require
more time and effort to change from Lambda-type.
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Section 2: Defense Engineering
I am an Engineer. In my profession I take deep pride. To it, I owe solemn
obligations.
As an Engineer, I pledge to practice integrity and fair dealing, tolerance and
respect, and to uphold devotion to the standards and the dignity of my profession,
conscious always that my skill carries with it the obligation to serve humanity by
making the best use of Earth’s precious wealth.
As an Engineer, I shall participate in none but honest enterprises. When needed,
my skill and knowledge shall be given without reservation for the public good. In
the performance of duty and in fidelity to my profession, I shall give the utmost.
- Organization for the Order of the Engineer (2014)

In this section I will describe how engineering is accomplished during a typical product
development cycle in order to better understand the defense engineer and field. I will provide a
general description of what an engineer does, compare and contrast defense engineers with
commercial engineers, and describe how a product is engineered in the defense industry to show
the role of engineering in the development of a defense product.
The field of Engineering
Bourdieu (1984) describes a field as a network of professional and personal relationships
within a hierarchy that provides for a venue for collecting and generating power. Engineering
encompasses a broad array of roles, disciplines, and industries, from design to management,
from civil to mechanical to environmental engineering, and from natural resource extraction to
manufacturing to public infrastructure (Campbell, 2010). Defense engineering is therefore a
subset of engineering and is associated with research, development, manufacturing, and support
of weapons systems and associated technologies. Defense engineering is the application of
science to the research, development, and technical management of weapons (such as bombs,
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missile, bullets), weapon delivery systems (such as guns, missile launchers), and weapon
platforms (such as planes, tanks, ships).
Defense Acquisition Process
The product development cycle is prescribed and contractually stipulated by the Pentagon
for development of all military products. These contractual stipulations include DoD’s Directive
5000.01 and DoD Instruction 5000.02. This product development cycle is an event based
defense acquisition management system. The overall framework is described in Figure 2 (see
Figure 2). I have provided an overview of the process based on the Defense Acquisition
Guidebook (2013), a 1248 page document, which describes the details of the Defense
Acquisition System.
To better understand the terminology of the industry, systems development and product
development should be considered synonymous. A system can be looked at as a process as well
at as a collection of subsystems and components that are needed to create a product.
Most engineering takes place during the Materiel Solution Analysis, Technology
Development, and Engineering and manufacturing development phases. The objective of the
Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase is to select and adequately describe a preferred materiel
solution to satisfy the phase-specific entrance criteria for the next program milestone designated
by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). Usually, but not always, the next milestone is a
decision to invest in technology maturation and preliminary design in the Technology
Development (TD) phase. The engineering activities in the MSA phase result in several key
products. First, a system model and/or architecture is developed that captures operational
context and envisioned concepts, describes the system boundaries and interfaces, and addresses
operational and functional requirements. Second, a preliminary system performance
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specification is developed that defines the performance of the preferred materiel solution. Third,
the engineer advises the program manager on what is to be prototyped, why, and how.

=



The Material Development Decision precedes entry into
any phase of the acquisition management system



Entrance criteria met before entering phase



Evolutionary Acquisition or Single Step to Full Capability

Decision
Point

=

Milestone
Review

=

Preliminary Design
Review (PDR)

=

Decision Point if PDR is not
conducted before Milestone
B

Figure 2. Defense Acquisition phases, decision points, and milestones.
During the MSA phase, the program team identifies a materiel solution to address user
capability gaps partially based on an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) (i.e., analysis of the set of
candidate materiel solutions) led by the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
and conducted by an organization independent from the Program Manager. Once the Service
sponsor selects a preferred materiel solution, the program team focuses engineering and technical
analysis on this solution to ensure development plans, schedule, funding, and other resources
match customer needs and match the complexity of the preferred materiel solution (The Defense
Acquisition Guidebook, 2013).
The primary objective of the Technology Development (TD) phase is to reduce technical
risk and develop a sufficient understanding of the materiel solution to support sound investment
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decisions at the pre- Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Review and at
Milestone B regarding whether to initiate a formal acquisition program. The engineer supports
the production of a preliminary system design that achieves a suitable level of system maturity
for low-risk entry into EMD. Usually the engineer implements a strategy of competitive
prototyping on a system element or subsystem level, balancing capability needs and design
considerations to synthesize system requirements for a preliminary end-item design for the
system. The major efforts associated with the TD phase are:


Determine the appropriate set of technologies to integrate into a full system.



Mature the technologies including demonstrating and assessing them in a relevant
environment.



Conduct competitive prototyping of the system and/or system elements.



Perform trade studies, refine requirements, and revise designs.



Develop the preliminary design, including functional and allocated baselines,
specifications, interface control drawings/documents, architectures, and system models.



Perform developmental test, as appropriate.
During the TD phase, the program develops and demonstrates prototype designs to

reduce technical risk, validate design approaches, validate cost estimates, and refine
requirements. In, addition, the TD phase efforts ensure the level of expertise required to operate
and maintain the product is consistent with the force structure. Technology development is an
iterative process of maturing technologies and refining user performance parameters to
accommodate those technologies that do not sufficiently mature (requirements trades). The
Initial Capabilities Document, the Technology Development Strategy (TDS), Systems
Engineering Plan (SEP), and draft Capability Development Document (CDD) guide the efforts
of this phase.
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There are two key technical objectives in the TD phase: technical risk reduction and
initial system development activity, culminating in preliminary design. The engineer in the TD
phase manages activities to evaluate prototyped solutions (preferably competitive prototypes)
against performance, cost, and schedule constraints to balance the total system solution space.
This information can then be used to inform the finalization of the system performance
specification as a basis for functional analysis and preliminary design.
Effective engineering, applied in accordance with the SEP and gated by technical
reviews, reduces program risk, identifies potential management issues in a timely manner, and
supports key program decisions. The TD phase provides the Program Manager with a
preliminary design and allocated baseline that are realistic and credible.
The primary objective of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase
is to develop the product baseline, verify it meets the system functional and allocated baselines,
and transform the preliminary design into a producible design, all within the schedule and cost
constraints of the program. Engineering activities support development of the detailed design,
verification that requirements are met, reduction in system-level risk, and assessment of
readiness to begin production and/or deployment. Primary engineering focus areas in EMD
include:


Complete the detailed build-to design of the system.



Establish the product baseline.



Conduct integration and tests of system elements and the system (where feasible).



Demonstrate system maturity and readiness to begin production for operational test and
/or deployment and sustainment activities
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The EMD phase includes technical assessment and control efforts, including value
engineering techniques to effectively manage risks and increase confidence in meeting system
performance, schedule, and cost goals. The planning, scheduling, and conduct of event-driven
technical reviews (Critical Design Review (CDR), Functional Configuration Audit (FCA),
System Verification Review (SVR), and Production Readiness Review (PRR)) are vital to
provide key points for assessing program maturity and the effectiveness of risk-reduction
strategies.
A detailed and well-documented EMD phase Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) builds on
the results of previous activities and significantly increases the likelihood of a successful
program compliant with the approved Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).
Implementing the technical plans as defined in the approved SEP guides the execution of
the complex and myriad tasks associated with completing the detailed design and integration,
and supports developmental test and evaluation activities. The SEP also highlights the linkage
between Technical Performance Measures (TPM), risk management, and earned-value
management activities to support tracking of cost growth trends. Achieving predefined EMD
technical review criteria provides confidence that the system meets stated performance
requirements (including interoperability and supportability requirements) and that design and
development have matured to support the initiation of the Production and Deployment (P&D)
phase.
Defense Engineering Fundamentals
The actual work expected from a defense engineer is well described in various
guidebooks including the Systems Engineering Fundamentals (Defense Acquisition University,
2014). The book focuses on the process of managing the engineering conducted on a defense
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product. The engineering process of getting from an idea to a proven solution is shown in Figure
3 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. The Engineering “V” diagram
Simply, the left side of the diagram is called the design side where requirements are
developed and allocated to sub systems and the subsystems are then designed to meet these
requirements. The right side of the diagram shows the product realization side which includes
the fabrication, integration and test. Production normally takes place after these events. This
process is far more intricate when used on complex systems (Defense Acquisition University,
2014). There are also many sub-steps that I’ve not explained. In summary, this can be a
complicated process to implement and many things can go wrong.
How Defense Engineers are Socialized, Assessed, and Evaluated
Defense engineers are socialized through a process of mentorship and teamwork. Most
defense products are developed by a team (commonly called development team), and an engineer
assigned to that team is expected to diligently execute assigned tasks in order to support cost,
schedule, and quality drivers.
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Each product under development requires a specific set of mix of engineers to realize.
There are many types of engineering specialties or disciplines including mechanical, electrical,
software, systems, aeronautical, chemical, and materials; depending on the project needs, the
right mix of engineering specialists is collated into a product team.
Each engineer brings a specialized set of common sense, or practical expertise, to work
and continues to collectively and incrementally add to this common sense. Under these
conditions, engineers are also exposed to and benefit from previous technical issues and solution
in areas otherwise beyond their training and responsibilities. Therefore, the development team,
made up of the various engineering disciplines (mechanical engineers, electrical engineers,
software engineers, etc.,) is a grouping of collective knowledge that continues to add to the
group’s acumen as well as each e individual’s practical knowledge as they achieve their goals.
This knowledge and experience then adds to the group’s symbolic capital. It does the same for
the individual members (Bourdieu, 1977 & Bourdieu, 1990b).
Both the ACME North and ACME South business units are part of a common field since
they are part of the defense industry and involved with the same product lines. Both business
units have also worked fairly closely since 1941 since many of the spare parts, re-engineering,
and new documentation were provided by ACME North to ACME South. Likewise, changes to
drawings, historic documentation, and issues reports were provided by ACME South when
needed by ACME North. In a way, ACME South was a customer of ACME North.
Bourdieu (1984) also describes a field as the arena of struggle for maintaining or
improving positions with regards to others in the field. This is where the two business units are
also very similar. Though one was a for-profit company and the other was a Navy arsenal, they
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both survived to this day where as many others in the industry have withered and gone. These
two business units have adjusted and changed in an unpredictably disruptive environment.
Section 3: Relevant Analytical Theories
This case study analyzed the findings using grounded social science. I combined the
method of Charmaz (2009) with the theories of Flyvbjerg (2008), Bourdieu (1977), and Goffman
(1961). Since phronesis and professional reputation as central to this study of two hero
engineers, I used Flyvbjerg to determine “power” in the system, apply phronesis to my analysis,
and link the human learning process to the development of a professional reputation. I used
Bourdieu to explain the conditions, environment, and power structures of the relationship
between the two business units, and linked power to professional reputation. I applied
Goffman’s “moral career,” or professional reputation, to the field of defense engineering to
explain the experiences of the two hero engineers. In this section I will describe each of these
theorists and the relevance of their theories to this case study. I will also attempt to weave the
three theorists, Flybjerg, Bourdieu, and Goffman as applied to phronetic behavior and
development of a professional reputation.
Flyvbjerg and the Study of Human Activity
According to Flyvbjerg (2008), there is a “Science War” going on between the natural
and social scientists. Natural scientists accuse social scientist of shoddy scholarship and for not
applying natural science methodologies. Social scientists retort back that not all human
scholarships can fit into the natural science models and require alternate methods. Flyvbjerg
(2008) judges this Science Wars as misleading, misguided and counterproductive. The two types
of science have their respective strengths and weaknesses along fundamentally different
dimensions. He provides a path out of this antagonism by recommending the application of
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phronesis, variously translated as prudence or practical wisdom. He believes that both sides
would benefit from applying phronesis to their studies.
Flyvbjerg’s Critique of Natural Science. According to Flyvbjerg (2008), the natural-science
model has been, and continues to be, an ideal shared by several traditions in the study of human
activity.
There is a logical simplicity [or analytical rationality] to the natural science
paradigm, and the natural sciences’ impressive material results speak for
themselves; these sciences certainly have an undeniable basis as a means by
which we have attempted to achieve mastery over nature, technology, and over
our own condition of life. (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.26).
….. advances in natural science research and technology progress are founded
upon relatively cumulative production of knowledge, the key concepts being
explanation and predication based on context-independent theories.
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.26).
The need for the subject to be context-independent implies that the application of natural
science methodologies require the absence of value or judgment. Therefore, natural science
based research is unable to easily answer questions of value, judgment, power, conflict, opinions,
intuition, reflection, beliefs, conscientiousness (the awareness of being right of wrong in one’s
behavior), and morality. As it is, natural-research scientists are unable to completely remove
their biases since they select topics, collect subject data, conduct analyses, and develop
conclusions.
Flyvbjerg’s Critique of Social Science. A critical lens that affords us an insight into
engineering, technology, and science workers in general is the use of Flyvbjerg’s (2008) concept
of phronesis and its applicability to generalization for social science investigations. He believes
that natural science and social science have been at odds with each other over methodologies
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because natural scientists such as physicists and chemists, who typically work with tangible data
and universally acceptable theories, have a tendency to expect the same from social scientists.
Additionally, they are questioning the legitimacy of social science research. Natural
scientists say social research results are irrational, or at least not helpful, since they cannot
generally produce concepts suitable for universal application. To avoid this this criticism, some
social science disciplines have emulated natural scientific methodologies. In response to
criticism and the negligible gains produced by mimicking the natural science methods, social
scientists have criticized that natural science cannot be used on all phenomena and that a lot of
social science investigations transcend natural science oriented investigations. Social scientists
also contend that where [natural] science cannot reach, art, literature, and narrative help us
comprehend the reality in which we live. Further, and as is reflected in much art and literature,
natural science’s attempts to isolate preset variables and argue for “value-free” applications
ignore much of how human authorities operate.
Flyvbjerg and Power. According to Flyvbjerg (2008), the following questions concerning
power and its use cannot be adequately answered by natural science research:
1. Who can adversely affect whose interests?
2. Who can control whom?
3. Who can obtain what?
4. Who can secure the achievement of collective resources?
5. Who is responsible for the outcome of power?
6. Who benefits from the outcome of power?
7. Where are the sources of change localized?
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8. Where are the points at which alternative arrangements or events could have made a
significant difference?
However, Flyvbjerg (2008) feels these are not enough to fully understand power as a
force relations and he offers Foucault’s definition and one key question: How is power
exercised?
“Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that
one hold on to or allows to slip away. Power is exercised rather than
possessed. Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a
complex strategical situation in a particular society.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.
117).
Flyvbjerg (2008), leveraging Foucault, states that one should analyze institutions from
the standpoint of power relations rather than vice versa. He goes on to define the conventional
view of power as:
“..negative: limits and prohibitions are central to its logic.
…rules based; rules determine what is permitted and forbidden, legal, and
illegal, acceptable and unacceptable, and what constitutes legitimate and
illicit behavior [sometimes experienced as inferred leverage or positional
power that is present in the system but rarely invoked].
It requires a uniform and visible apparatus of power; power is exercised
from above and downwards, uniformly and comprehensively; all are equal
before power, differences are attributable only to differences in scale, not in
type of power to which it is exposed.
The power apparatus is placed on the one side, the obedient subject on the
other.
It is power that only has the force of the negative on its side – a power to say
no; in no condition to produce, capable only of posting limits, it is basically
anti-energy.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 119).
Flyvbjerg (2008), again leveraging Foucault, recommends taking on a more
comprehensive perspective and expands the definition of power. With this addition, power is
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more than a set of institutions and mechanisms that ensure servile citizens in a given state; more
than a form of subordination which instead of violence, sets rules; and more than the general
system of domination that one group exercise over another. This expanded view defines power
in terms of force relations which are changeable and unstable:
“Power must be understood as a multiplicity of force relations “imminent in
the sphere on which they operate and which constitute their own
organization.”
Power is the process, which via struggles and confrontations transforms,
supports, or reverses these force relations.
Power is the support which the force relations find in each other via the
creation of chains or systems, or conversely, via the separation and
opposition which isolate then from each other.
Power is the strategies in which the force relations obtain effects ….in the
forms of laws and various social hegemonies.
Power is dynamic and everywhere … and is produced from one moment to
the next in all points and all relations.
Power is productive and should not only be described in negative terms: it
‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals’.
In fact, power produces, it produces reality; it produces domains of object
and rituals of truth.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 121).
According to Flyvbjerg, Foucault’s proposed concept of power is as follows:
1. Power relations do not stand in an external relationship to other forms of
relationships. For example, power relations are inherent in economic
process, relations of knowledge and rationality, or sexual relations. Also
that the power relations bring about the immediate effect of divisions [or
unions], inequities [or equities], and imbalances [or balances] found in
the relations.
2. Power [sometimes] comes from below. Power is not based upon a
bipolar and comprehensive opposition between ruling and ruled. There
exists no general ordering of power. This does not mean that social
classes and social domination do not exist. It means only that both the
dominant and the dominated enter into relations of power which none of
them control in a simple absolute way.
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3. Power cannot be “acquired,” “taken,” or “shared” nor can it be
retained or allowed to” slip away.”
Power is exercised from
innumerable points in an interaction between unequal and mobile
relations. Inequities in power relations must be traced back to their actual
material functioning.
4. Where there is power, there is resistance. In the relations of power, there
is necessarily the possibility of resistance. If there is no possibility of
resistance… there would be no relations of power. Therefore, the study
of the antagonism in the system may be used to analyze power.
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 121).
5. Real Change in power requires changing ourselves, our bodies, our
souls, and our ways of knowledge. It requires “work of the self upon the
self.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 122).
In addition to asking the standard “Who? – What? – Where?” questions, Flyvbjerg
recommends a phronetic point of departure to questions. I will describe phronesis in the next
section but in the meantime, these phronesis based questions are:
1. What are the most immediate and most local power relations operating, and how do
they operate?
2. How are the power relations linked together, according to what logic and strategy?
3. How do the rationalities support or oppose the power relations?
4. How can the games of power be played differently (Flyvbjerg, 2008)?
Recommended Path - Phronesis. Flyvbjerg (2008) agrees that the criticism of social science is
right but offers a method to overcome this impasse: Instead of emulating the natural sciences and
creating a general theory, he tells us to focus on the strength of social science which is in the
rich, reflexive analysis of values and power. He recommends using the idea of phronesis.
In Aristotle’s words, phronesis is a “true state, reasoned, and capable of action
with regard to things that are good or bad for man.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 2).
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…phronesis emphasizes practical knowledge and practical ethics. Phronesis
is often translated as “prudence or practical common sense.” (Flyvbjerg,
2008, p. 56).
“Phronesis is what permits one to chase away false opinions and make good
decisions.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 110).
Therefore, phronesis goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and
technical knowledge (techne) and involves intuition, judgments and decisions made in the
manner of a virtuoso social and political actor. Simply, phronesis allows us to analyze values –
things that are good or bad for us. Intuition does not mean some kind of guesswork, irrationality,
or supernatural inspiration but a property that each individual uses in everyday life. This
intuition transcends rules-based behavior because an expert already has related experiences that
can be drawn upon by holistically discriminating among classes of situations and developing an
appropriate response to a new situation. In the long run phronesis is what permits one to chase
away false opinions and make good decisions (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 110).
Intuition is the ability to draw directly on one’s own experience – bodily,
emotional, intellectual –and to recognize similarities between these experiences
and new situations. Intuition is internalized; it is part of the individual.
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.21).
In light of the logic of Flyvbjerg’s critique of contemporary social science, it is important
to understand power in order to understand the defense industry. Operationalized in this study,
and following Flyvbjerg’s assumption of phonetic research’s guiding questions, the following
four value-rational questions guided the research:
1. Where are we going?
2. Who gains and who loses, by which mechanism of power?
3. Is it desirable?
4. What should be done?
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Various ideas presented by Flyvbjerg are well represented in this case study. The defense
business is heavily focused in engineering and mathematics and therefore, tends towards a
mentality where quantitative analysis plays a significant role in decision making. Simply, having
used quantitative means, there is a pervasive mentality that we can engineer through the various
human and social “obstacles.” This mentality is evident in the focused attention to “engineering
utilization,” Earned Value System, and number of employees at ACME South. Quantitative
means are necessary but, there is a place and a use for these means, especially is engineering
design and analysis. Beyond that, in order to find meaning, future implications, and a holistic
solution, one has to turn to qualitative analysis. Therefore, in defense engineering, there needs to
be a balance between qualitative and quantitative analysis in defense engineering evaluation.
Applying Flyvbjerg (2008), as an engineer continues to develops skills and professional
reputation progressing from a novice, on to advanced beginner, competent performer, to
proficient performer, and ultimately to expert; at each stage, an engineer move from a
quantitative mindset to a more qualitative mentality.
Human-Learning Process Model. Flyvbjerg leverages the Dreyfus and Dreyfus model of
Human-Learning Process and links this process to phronesis. This process is made up of five
levels including novice, advanced beginner, competent performer, proficient performer, and
expert. Individuals progress through these levels as they learn a given skill (Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1986). Not all people achieve the higher levels in a given filed. Table 3 (see Table 3) provides
the general descriptions of the various levels in the Dreyfus and Dreyfus model.
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Table 3. Dreyfus and Dreyfus Model Levels (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986)
Level

Analysis Type

Description

Novice

Quantitative

Acts on the basis of context-independent elements and rules.

Advanced
Beginner

Quantitative

Adds situational elements which they have learned to identify
and interpret on the basis of their own experience from similar
situations.

Competent
performer

Quantitative

Uses goals and plans as a basis of their actions to structure
and store masses of both context-dependent and contextindependent information.

proficient
performer

Qualitative

Identifies problems, goals, and plans intuitively from their
own appropriately based perspective. Intuitive choice is
checked by analytical evaluation prior to action.

expert

Qualitative

Behavior is intuitive, holistic, and synchronic, understood in a
way that a given situation releases a picture problem, goal,
plan, decision, and action in one instant and with no division
into phases. Experts are characterized by a flowing, effortless
performance, unhindered by analytical deliberation.

Existing research provides no evidence that intuition and judgment can be externalized
into rules and explanations, which, if followed, lead to the same results as intuitive behavior.
Experts add judgment, practice, trial and error, experience, common sense, intuition, and bodily
sensation to analysis and rationality to reach decisions. According to Flyvbjerg (2008),
Rational or rules based thinking generally constitutes an obstacle to good results,
not because rules and rationality are problematic in themselves, but because the
rational perspective has to be elevated from being necessary to being sufficient,
even exclusive. This has caused people to become blind to context, experience,
and intuition, even though these phenomena and ways of being are at least as
important and necessary for good results as are analysis, rationality, and rules.
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 24).
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Flyvbjerg (2008) further differentiates an expert as emphasizing understanding as distinct
from explaining and the ability to identify relevant facts within a given situation. Channeling
Aristotle, Flyvbjerg (2008) is able to apply phronesis as the context-based thinking, practice,
experience, common sense, intuition, and practical wisdom. Therefore, an expert applies
phronesis to their work.
Considering praxis, the iterative process of reflection and action, Flyvbjerg (2008) argues
that conscientiousness begets ethical behavior, and an expert aims for ethical behavior though
conscientiousness and phronesis.
Bourdieu and the Logic of Practice
Bourdieu’s Habitus and Field. I applied Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and field not only
to provide an understanding of a defense engineer but also to the relationship between the two
business units. The theory is that each individual, or social agent, occupies a multidimensional
social space and the agent is not only defined by social class but also by every single kind of
“capital” he or she can accumulate through social relations. Bourdieu (1984, 1990a, 1990b)
shows that capital, includes the value of social networks, could be used to produce or reproduce
inequity. Therefore, each agent engages in a specific complex of social relations in everyday
practice or “field.” The agent will develop a certain disposition, or habitus, for social action that
is conditioned by position on the field (dominant/dominated, orthodox/heterodox,
passive/aggressive, etc.). This habitus is then revealed through the agent’s actions, thoughts,
outlooks, and personalities (Bourdieu, 1990a).
Bourdieu (1984) describes habitus as the mental and cognitive structures used to interact
within one’s environment [or one’s world]; the internalized methods, schemes, and procedures
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used to understand, interpret, evaluate and judge one’s condition, one’s environment or others;
the internalized structures that reflect one’s class, age, gender, etc.; and the practical skills and
dispositions necessary to navigate within one’s field.
Bourdieu (1990b) also explains Class habitus as the homogenizing of group resulting
from the homogeneity of the conditions of existence. Class habitus is the subjective but nonindividual system of internalized structures, schemas of perception, conception, and action
common to all members of that group [or class].
Bourdieu (1984) describes field as a network of relationships within a hierarchy that is
occupied by people and constrained by established responsibility. Good examples of how a field
operates include art, religion, science, education, higher education, technology, economics, and
politics. Field is also the arenas of struggle for maintaining or improving positions with regards
to others in the field. Participation in the field generates capital (economic, cultural, social, and
symbolic). This capital is then used to compete and determine positions within the field and
control the fate of others
Economic capital is based on accumulated economic means or resources that determine
buying power. Cultural capital is based on the legitimate knowledge that allows for navigating
one’s field. Social capital is based on the valued social relationships and symbolic capital is
based on the honor and prestige afforded to the individual (Bourdieu, 1984). Each group has a
group capability or common sense that helps achieve goals; the application of this capability
generates symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is also the set of resources available to an
individual on the basis of honor, prestige, or recognition and series of value that one holds within
a culture. Symbolic capital accumulates primarily from the fulfillment of social obligations that
are embedded with potential for prestige (Bourdieu, 1990b).
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In order to understand the defense industry environment, it is necessary to know what types
of individuals gravitate towards a career in engineering. An engineer is typically driven by the
idea of investigating, designing, and making new products. The engineer of today is socially
competent and excited about the opportunities and challenges of developing and producing new
products. Likewise, it is important to distinguish a defense engineer since this is a specialized
form of engineering geared towards the development and production of highly-reliable, longlasting defense systems. These defense engineers usually work on complex, long-term projects
that can take up to five years to design.
The management of these complex engineering projects (organizing the work and
managing to the allocated funding) also requires dealing with various inescapable business,
Congressional, and pentagon bureaucracies that often hinder and interfere with progress. In all
cases, the projects have to meet Pentagon acquisition cycle requirements and are executed in
accordance with established government processes. Therefore, each project has its unique set of
challenges since the field and individual habitus are a mix of multiple engagements in an
organic, ever changing environment. I plan to use the following descriptions for habitus, capital
and field.
Habitus. Habitus can be defined as a system of dispositions. Dispositions are the lasting,
acquired schemes of perceptions, thoughts, and actions. The individual agent develops these
dispositions in response to the objective conditions he or she encounters. Bourdieu (1990a)
theorizes the agent’s thoughts, or subjective mental experiences, are indoctrinated by the agent’s
[perceived] environment, or objective social structures. Habitus is similar to socialization but
also accounts for expertise, knowledge, or skill that one has acquired in the field and is now an
assumed, integral part of a person’s thoughts and actions (Ritzer, 2007). Habitus can also be
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used to analyze collective dispositions at the organization level. Thus a defense firm is more
than the sum of the disposition of its individual employees since not all are exactly alike.
Capital. Bourdieu extends the notion of capital beyond the normal use in economics. He allows
capital to also include social, cultural, and symbolic forms. Economic capital is the money and
assets put to productive use. According to Siisiainen (2000), Social capital is the accumulating
of actual or virtual durable networks of institutionalized relationships that can be leveraged to
endorse, augment, or change a system. Applying this to my case, network power is the
relationship between ACME, the Pentagon and Congress. Likewise, cultural capital is the
competencies, skills, and qualifications that legitimize the holder’s cultural authority.
Sometimes cultural capital can be used to challenge economic capital.
According to Bourdieu (1990a), symbolic capital, such as prestige, honor and attention, is
a crucial source of power that is not easily perceived or accepted as “capital.” A holder of
symbolic power uses the power, though social interaction, to influence and change an action of
an agent who holds less. Bourdieu (1977) calls this symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is the
implicit coercion conveyed through gestures, actions, and symbols to control and direct others
and to promulgate the social order. This method of coercion is accepted as just by the dominant
agent and legitimate and unquestionable by the dominated. I plan to look at the situation from
social capital, cultural capital and symbolic capital and attempt to link Bourdieu’s capital to
Flyvbjerg’s power.
Field. A field is a structured social space with its own management structure (schemes of
domination), legitimate opinions, ideas, policies, processes, and procedures. Fields are relatively
autonomous for the wider social structure [or space] (Bourdieu, 1990a). Engineering, and
specifically defense engineering, are the fields central to this research.
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Goffman and a Moral Career/Professional Reputation
To better understand how a defense engineer thinks and acts, I applied Goffman’s
concept of a moral career. According to Goffman (1961) each moral career, and behind this,
each self, occurs within the confines of a total institutional system. The self in this sense is not a
property of the person to whom it is attributed, but dwells rather in the pattern of social control
that is exerted in connection with the person by himself and those around him. This special kind
of institutional arrangement does not so much support the self as constitute it. Also that every
institution captures time and interests of its members and becomes [somewhat of] a world for
them. I will also further discuss the applicability of total institution to defense contractors in
next sub section.
Goffman (1961) describes one’s moral career as involving a standard sequence of
changes in one’s way of conceiving of [or constructing] one’s own self and the selves of others.
Also that each self occurs within the personal and professional relationships brought about by
one’s place of work. The self can then be seen as something that resides in the arrangements
prevailing in a social system for its members. Therefore, one’s place of work helps create one’s
self.
According to Goffman (1961), a moral career is about one’s professional reputation with
moral overtones. The way to develop this reputation, or honor is through a series of dispositions
that emphasizes one’s duty and execution of that duty. Doing one’s duty is therefore means
conforming to the social order by respecting rhythms, keeping pace, not falling out of line; as a
way of reasserting solidarity, and in a way conformity or standing with others (Bourdieu, 1977,
p. 161). A worthy engineer is therefore defined as one who possesses a sense of
conscientiousness of his responsibility. Goffman (1961) provides a list of experiences one may
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go through to come to an understanding of their moral career. These experiences are listed in
Figure 4 (see Figure 4).
Experiences that can lead to an understanding of one’s moral career/professional reputation:
1. That one needs to reach out for the help of others in getting work done and that
this shared work is for mutual benefits.
2. Some work may be considered “unjust deprivation.” This is the mundane, nonvalue added, time wasting, and personally humiliating work.
3. One’s role should be complementary to others on the team.
4. One may not be able to complete all and this may lead to feelings of guilt.
5. One’s recognized-self rises through the view one constructs when looking
backwards over one’s progress (creation of the peculiarly retroactive character).
6. One may be deserted, abandoned, or sacrificed by one’s coworkers (the idea of
letting go of bad or divergent personal bonds and creating new bonds as one
moves on).
7. One cannot hide too much about oneself from others in the system and that one’s
work history is often revealed to others when successful outcomes are re-used
and one’s advice is sought, or on the other side, when others have to clean up
one’s past mistakes and marginal work. Plus, there is talk and gossip in the
system.
8. Cycles of alienation and mortification (humiliation) allow for new sets of beliefs
and opportunities to reconceive a self.
Figure 4. Experiences that can lead to an understanding of one’s moral career/professional
Reputation

Total Institution. I also looked at the working conditions of a defense engineer to see if defense
companies are “total institutions”. It is necessary to do this evaluation since our customers (the
Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force) are typical total institution and may attempt to transfer
total-institution controls and behaviors to the defense industry. Goffman describes a total
institution as have specific key features of a totalitarian social system and can be clustered in five
rough groupings:


First, there are institutions established to care for persons thought to be both incapable
and harmless; these are the homes for the blind, the aged, the orphaned, and the
indigent.
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Second, there are places established to care for persons thought to be at once
incapable of looking after themselves and a threat to the community, albeit an
unintended one: TB sanatoriums, mental hospitals, and leprosarium.



Third, another type of total institution is organized to protect the community against
what are thought to be intentional dangers to it; here the welfare of the persons thus
sequestered is not the immediate issue. Examples are: Jails, penitentiaries, POW
camps, and concentration camps.



Fourth, we find institutions purportedly established the better to pursue some
technical task and justifying themselves only on these instrumental grounds: Army
barracks, ships, boarding schools, work camps, colonial compounds, large mansions
from the point of view of those who live in the servants' quarters, and so forth.



Finally, there are those establishments designed as retreats from the world or as
training stations for the religious: Abbeys, monasteries, convents, and other cloisters.

According to Foster (2014), the central feature of total institutions can be described as a
breakdown of the kinds of barriers ordinarily separating the sleep, play, and work aspects of our
lives. First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same single
authority. Second, each phase of the member's daily activity will be carried out in the immediate
company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same
thing together. Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity
leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole circle of activities being imposed from
above through a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the contents of
the various enforced activities are brought together as parts of a single overall rational plan
purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution.
Individually, these totalistic features are also in places other than total institutions.
Increasingly, for example, our large commercial, industrial and educational establishments
provide cafeterias, minor services, and off-hour recreation for their members. But while this is a
tendency in the direction of total institutions, participation remains voluntary.
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Another key feature of total institutions can be a significant split between those with
highly prized responsibilities and privileges and the various sets of others. For example,
management has significant privileges that an engineer may not have. These privileges may
include freedom of movement, access to more information, decision making, and ability to
interact with the greater world.
There are many aspects of total institutions that apply to defense companies. All defense
business locations have security guards, locked doors, cameras, and access control to not only
keep non-employees out but these same systems may also be used to track and monitor employee
activities. Employees are expected to wear their identity badges at all times and use these badges
to get into various parts of the building including their work areas. In most cases, these
engineers work in small cubicles the size of a prison cell. There are various regimented
behaviors in the system including the tracking of engineering hours to charge numbers associated
with respective projects. Employees and their managers also have to sign and approve these time
charges. If an employee has more than expected indirect charge (unbillable time), that employee
may have to provide written rationale.
Defense companies also have written protocol for every possible contingency. The work
is also regimented, tightly-scheduled, and structured, through the use of project plans,
procedures, and policies. The tracking of project progress is conducted at various levels through
project meetings and an automated earned value management system, a system designed to track
and report anomalous/unplanned spending.
However, there are also aspects of the business that do not align with total institutions.
For example, most defense engineers have the freedom and choice to separate their sleep, play
and work environments. They may work in teams and are fully influenced by the teams pace,
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each team member is assigned a specific and special responsibility (i.e., they don’t all do the
same work). Also, a defense engineer can outright quit whenever they want regardless of project
status or incompletion. Defense engineers are paid positions and are usually afforded flexible
time to come and do their work; increasingly, more and more defense engineers also
telecommute. I will continue my discussion of total institutional and look at it from individual
perspective rather than at institutional level.
Professional Reputation – A Synthesis
In this section I will attempt to weave Bourdieu (1977), Flyvbjerg (2008), and Goffman
(1961) to create a synthesis of a professional reputation and apply that to this case study. I will
start by defining what I mean by a professional reputation, then identify a few guiding principles,
and list a few pitfalls one may encounter. Though I am discussing professional reputation in
defense engineering, my larger goal is to leverage professional reputation as a foundation for
rising above and transcending beyond one’s career. This transcending is part of a moral
component that both Flyvbjerg and Goffman reference to in discussing the context or work and
other social activities.
Recalling that a moral career is about one’s professional reputation with moral overtones
and it involves a sequence of changes in one’s way of conceiving of [or constructing] one’s own
self and the selves of others in a total institution (Goffman 1961), I would like to propose the use
of “professional reputation” instead of moral career. I believe the two terms are interchangeable
and the “moral overtones” modifier unnecessary since all institutional stimuli lead to the decision
of right and wrong action. Likewise, an absolute “total institution” environment is unnecessary
to construct a moral career since “partially” total institutions, like the many defense industry
business units, create the same set of experiences as stated in Figure 4 (see Figure 4). According
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to Goffman (1961), one’s professional reputation is a process of generating meaningfulness,
realization, discovery, and understanding of oneself, one's environment, and one's opportunities.
In a way, this is generating knowledge through practice.
According to Bourdieu (1997) the way to develop this reputation, or honor is through a
series of dispositions that emphasizes one’s duty and execution of that duty; also that Personal
growth comes from the accumulation of cultural capital and the dialectical interaction between
the individual agent's habitus and the contextual environment (field). Flyvbjerg (2008) leverages
the Dreyfus and Dreyfus Model of Human Learning Process to say that one professional
reputation increases as they move up levels from novice, advanced beginner, competent
performer, proficient performer, to expert.
Three recommendations that are common to Bourdieu (1977), Flyvbjerg (2008), and
Goffman (1961) are: Use rules, procedures, methods, and process judiciously; develop reflective
practice; and develop conscientiousness. The use of process and procedures are common to the
field of defense engineering and one cannot militantly apply these to everything without
understanding applicability. Though Goffman (1961) writes about the process as a means to
destroy the old self and create a new self, once a new self is created, one becomes more aware of
processes and process malleability.
Intuition and judgment cannot be externalized into rules and explanations.
Experts add judgment, practice, trial and error, experience, common sense,
intuition, and bodily sensation to analysis and rationality to reach decisions.
According to Flyvbjerg (2008), Rational or rules based thinking generally
constitutes an obstacle to good results, not because rules and rationality are
problematic in themselves, but because the rational perspective has to be
elevated from being necessary to being sufficient, even exclusive. This has
caused people to become blind to context, experience, and intuition, even
though these phenomena and ways of being are at least as important and
necessary for good results as are analysis, rationality, and rules. (Flyvbjerg,
2008, p. 24).
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There is a right way and a right moment to apply rules. (Bourdieu, 1977,
p.20).
The development of a professional reputation also requires reflection and reflective
practice (Learning from one's experience) to generate new meanings. This practice is learning
about oneself and one's work and developing the capacity to reflect on action so as to engage in a
process of continuous learning. It involves paying critical attention to the practical values and
theories which inform everyday actions. Reflective practice leads to development of insight and
informed ethical practice.
One’s recognized-self rises through the view one constructs when looking
backwards over one’s progress (creation of the peculiarly retroactive
character). (Goffman, 1961, p. 145).
… the transformation of the generative schemes is doubtless reinforced and
accelerated by the dialectic between the schemes immanent in practice and
the norms produced by reflection on practice, which imposes new meanings
on them by reference to alien (or new) structures. (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 57).
The reflection of habitus is what enables the attaining of realization. And
that it may take a long time and intentional effort to achieve this. (Bourdieu,
1990b, p. 57).
Intuition (and not application of rules) as the ability to draw directly upon
one's own experience to recognize the similarities between that experience
and the new situation. (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 21).
…. Rationality may endanger sensitivity to context, experience, and
intuition. (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 24).
Another connection between the three authors is the development of conscientiousness
(knowing right from wrong) as one progresses professional reputation. According to Flyvbjerg
(2008), an expert aims for ethical behavior though conscientiousness and phronesis [practical
wisdom]. The way to develop this reputation, or honor is through a series of dispositions that
emphasizes one’s duty and execution of that duty.
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An expert … operates from tacit skills which are skills that are characterized
by the highest level of the learning process. …..and commonly called
practical consciousness. (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 35).
Doing one’s duty… therefore means conforming to the social order by
respecting rhythms, keeping pace, not falling out of line; as a way of
reasserting solidarity, and in a way conformity or standing with others.
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 161).
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY
Just as the methods we choose influence what we see, what we
bring to the study also influences what we can see.
- Kathy Charmaz (2009)
In this chapter I will describe the methodology used in my case study. This study
combined two methods to weave a more comprehensive picture of the situation and also to
provide a just and fair representation of the stakeholders. I used case-study methodology in
tandem with a grounded theory approach for data collection and analysis. I believe these two
methods allow for the best complements of strengths and limitations (Yin, 2009). In the next
two sections I will discuss my reasons for selecting these two methods.
Case Study
According to Yin (2009), the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our
knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena.
Therefore, I will investigate the complex relationship between ACME North and ACME South
and identify the various elements that have adversely impacted their relationship including
history, personnel, organization structure and leadership. The scope of this study is to examine
and develop a thorough understanding of one or two elements that are represented in the data.
The case study methodology is best suited since it provided an in-depth understanding of the
relationship and that it is conducive to multiple sources such as interviews, observations, and
other business artifacts (Plank Clark, & Creswell, 2007).
As I investigated the discordant relationship between the two business units, I
encountered two individuals with exemplary selflessness, ability to navigate the murky moral
path, and despite their right actions and good outcome, they are neither recognized nor rewarded.
They are my unsung heroes in this system and are called hero engineers.
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However, these hero engineers would be one-dimensional if not placed in the context of
their environment. Therefore, this study also provides information on the two business units,
their history, and the overall leadership/management as a framework for these hero engineers.
As mentioned, I looked at two representative projects between the two business units.
The first project was the transition of medium-caliber naval gun called Catapult (a pseudonym)
production from ACME North to ACME South. In this case, since management was not allowed
to bring the repair business from ACME South to ACME North, they decided to send the
production of Catapult to ACME South. The result was a rough transition from highly capable
production line that was run for over 20 years to a new line fraught with unanticipated issues
with productivity, schedule, and cost. More capability had to be added to ACME South to
compensate for this debacle. The second project called Reverse Colonize (a pseudonym) was to
move the technical publication group, responsible for development of product technical manuals,
from ACME North to ACME South. This project immediately ran into problems because they
did not have the right mix of domain experts at ACME South. Both these project required the
dismantling of capabilities at ACME North and setup/startup of capabilities at ACME South.
These projects are further described in the Chapter 5.
Strengths and limitations of case research
Case studies are best when used on “how” or “why” in investigations (Yin, 2009). A
common concern about case studies is that they provide little bases for scientific generalization
(from a single case). As stated by Yin (2009), [a single case] does not represent a “sample”
conducive to statistical generalizations but to expand and generalize theories or analytical
generalization.
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As an engineer I have significant background in technical or natural science
methodologies. However, the qualitative nature of this study would be better served by
Flyvbjerg’s (2008) social science methodologies and Bourdieu’s (1990a) habitus and field to
unearth the characteristics of the hero engineers, the nature of their environment and to better
understand the power in the system.
Grounded Theory
I used grounded theory for data collection, coding, and analysis. I have been aware of
the relationship issues between the two business units for many years and this experience will
help in collecting rich and relevant data. As mentioned before, I hope to discover certain
generalized understanding of not only the relationship between the two business units but also
the working of the defense industry as a whole. I am also interested in the participants as a group
and therefore, application of grounded theory would be ideal (Plank Clark & Creswell, 2007. p.
63). I used grounded theory coding methods to conduct data analysis and develop a conditional
matrix as a coding device to allow me to make connections between micro and macro conditions
of the case.
Applying generalizations. It was my not my direct intent to generalize the findings in this study
to all inter-corporate relationships in the defense industry. My research focused on ACME;
however, the conditions influencing the relationship between ACME North and ACME South
are common to the whole industry and therefore, it is likely others are facing similar issues.
Flyvbjerg (2008) warns us not to discount the generalizability of the findings since it is
appropriate to consider this an exploratory study that could be augmented by additional studies.
He also says that formal generalizations are but one of many hypothetico-deductive models and
applicability is based on the researcher possessing a wide range of practical skills for carrying
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out the study. Simply, formal generalization is one of many ways which people create and
accumulate knowledge and that knowledge which cannot be formally generalized does not mean
that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation.
Additionally, the narratives revealed the natural and results of science methods that were
implemented to improving the conditions between the two business units. For instance, it is very
likely that management looked at the relationship between the business units with a natural
science perspective that the clinical nature of any issues would be (quickly) resolved by
technological and scientific methods. This case captured these events and methods for
evaluation of their respective successes. The initial result was chaos in the system. It took many
years of fine-tuning and reorganizing to achieve a working balance.
Data Source
Demographics. This section provides the demographic details of the participants. I interviewed
managers and engineers with relevant knowledge of the case. The managers and engineers were
selected from various levels of responsibility and experiences based on their involvement with
both ACME North and ACME South. The selection method will be based on snowball sampling
(Nardi, 2006). Table 4 (see Table 4) provides further details of their makeup.
Consent form and confidentiality. All participants were volunteers and provided willful
consent to participate. Participants signed two consent forms; one for their keep and the other
for my files. I interviewed the personnel listed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Demographic data
Name

Title/Description

1

Mark M

Catapult Program Engineering Manager and Navy Program Logistics
Manager. Over 40 years of experience at ACME North. Responsible
for the development and production of the Catapult gun. One time
manager of the engineering group at ACME South. Has work ongoing
in both locations. Most knowledgeable about both locations.

2

Jason A

Director of Product Design. Has more than 200 engineers in his group
in locations throughout the U.S. Over 27 years of experience at ACME
North.

3

David L

Functional manager for electrical and mechanical engineers. Over 30
years of experience at ACME North. Does not have any relationship to
ACME South but helps his manager Jason A manage engineering
utilization.

4

Barry O

New manager assigned to find work for ACME South engineers. Over
25 years of experience at ACME North where his office is located.
Reports to Jason A.

5

Mel G

Former engineering lead for ACME South. Has over 15 years of
experience at ACME North and has worked at ACME South for over
17 years. He was the middle person between the two business units.
He has provided management, direction, and guidance to ACME South
engineers.

My involvement as a participant-observer is a privilege. I followed the University of
St. Thomas Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines using pseudonyms and confidential
agreements at all times. To maintain company confidentiality and sensitive business
information, I only shared data with my advisor. I did not plan to provide participants with their
interview transcription unless they show an interest. There were no payments for participation.

PHRONESIS IN DEFENSE ENGINEERING

64

In some cases, more than one interview was conducted to clarify and add more details. All
interviews in were conducted face-to-face.
Guiding research questions. These draft questions were developed to elicit the condition of the
relationship between the two business units. However, in order not to lead the participants
during the interview and to provide for good triangulation and validity the questions will focus
on each participant’s knowledge of the history, views on the ongoing projects, and opinions on
what was working and what was not working. These interviews were conducted in the style
called “the interview conversation” where the in-depth nature of an intensive interview fosters
eliciting each participant’s interpretation of his or her experience (Charmaz, 2009). I plan to
conduct at least one interview per interviewee. These guiding questions include:
1. What is your title and role at ACME?
2. What projects are you working on and please describe the work you are doing?
3. What is the history of ACME North/ACME South as a business entity?
4. How is work and management directions shared between the two business units?
5. Could you describe the relationship?
6. What are the things that work between the business units and things that do not seem
to work?
7. What changes would you like to see in the future?
These questions were intended as initial premise to start a more wide-ranging and indepth conversations. Since participants come from various levels of knowledge, not all
questions may be pertinent to everyone.
Data collection Strategy. Interviews were recorded on digital recorder and then transcribed. I
used real names during interviews and to change to pseudonyms during the process of
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transcribing. The recorded data resided on compact disks lock-stored at my home and all
recordings were destroyed upon completion of this case study. ACME management was not
provided access to these recordings and is not interested in this data. I also used various
publically released data from ACME to provide a rich history of the two business units.
I initially focused on the two projects under study. Based on data analysis, the behavior
of two individuals in the system became more the prominent subject and therefore I switched to
the capture of their phronetic behaviors and the ongoing ACME North and ACME South
dynamics that is conducive to phronesis.
I also generated field notes on the various subject including my personal experience at
ACME North, my trips to ACME South, various thoughts and emotions on the subjects that were
brought up during interviews. A sample of these field notes are provided later in this chapter.
Data processing. As mentioned before, I used grounded theory methods established by
Charmaz (2009) to capture rich data through personal observations, intensive interviews, memo
writing, and qualitative coding. I used qualitative coding, the process of defining what the data
are about as the first analytic interpretation or step. This method of coding, that fosters the study
of actions and processes, worked extremely well for this case study since it illuminated the action
and methods employed by ACME and the two business units.
The method of initial coding, focused coding, and axial coding (connecting themes)
allowed for the systematic conversion of raw data to analysis. The initial coding focused on
events, incidents and actions of the business, managers, and workers. The line-by-line coding
method (Charmaz, 2009) for quick and spontaneous initial coding allowed me to remain close to
the data. In some cases, I used in-vivo codes to maintain the meanings and actions conveyed by
specific participants (Charmaz, 2009).
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In focused coding, the second major stage of coding, I used analytical directions to
synthesize and explain larger segments of the data. At this stage, I identified the more relevant
and significant codes (or themes) that provided inclusive and comprehensive analytical sense.
Likewise, in some cases the axial coding allowed me to relate categories and sub categories by
fracturing the data and re-assembling into new ways (Charmaz, 2009).
Data Analysis. Data analysis on the ACME North and ACME South relationship was
conducted by developing a conditional matrix. Since it was my intent to describe the two
projects, the conditional matrix provided a skeleton timeline to which I was able to “hook” the
relevant pieces of data and then weave results into a cohesive narrative. A database was used to
manage the re-assembled pieces of data. For professional reputations, I used a similar approach
using another conditional matrix.
I applied Charmaz (2009), Flyvbjerg (2008), Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990a and 1990b),
and Goffman (1959 and 1961) to understand power dynamics, apply phronesis (practical
wisdom), and describe the makings of professional reputations.
Maintaining ethical standards. I adhered to the University of St. Thomas’ Institutional Review
Board (IRB) requirements and discussed my ethical issues with my advisor. Since this subject is
directly related to my work, and I intend to be a member of ACME for the foreseeable future, I
have the necessary prolonged engagement in the subject under study. My intention was to do no
harm to the participants or to the organizations.
Field Notes
I generated numerous field notes during this case study. Many of them were to capture
my initial analysis of the situation and to make sense of what I was discovering. I’ve included a
few field notes in this section.
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ACME North. ACME North is an impressive building. It has roughly two million square feet
of space under a single roof. This is one of the largest buildings in our state. Originally, there
were numerous separate buildings. A few years after construction, a single roof was added to
cover all the buildings into one to ensure uninterrupted work during our harsh Midwest winters.
The plant is surrounded by open space and parking lots. There are few windows in the building
and most of the office space is located in the inner parts of the building; therefore, it is often that
I do not see the sun at all during my work hours. The building also has a worn-out look but I
have grown to tolerate the conditions due to the significant history of our building.
The plant is laid out like a city. It has named “roads” and locations. For example, the
main two north-south arteries in the building are called Central Ave (a pseudonym) and
Blackstone Ave (a pseudonym). There are also numbered roads, running east-west, and address
posts throughout the plant; for example, a delivery to 34 Ave 10 W would mean deliver to post
marked “10” on the west side of Central Ave on 34th Ave. The arteries and some avenues are
capable of semi-truck traffic in order to facilitate the transport of large products. There are
industrial carts, fork trucks, bicycles, and pedestrian traffic throughout the building; with each
having rules to provide safe movement of product and people. People traffic is only allowed
within the confines of a four-foot marking on the roads. To ensure safety, all employees are
empowered in the care-taking of others and can challenge inappropriate and dangerous behavior.
All personnel must have a valid badge to enter the premises. The badges come in various
colors to denote levels of access. All visitors must have a valid business reason to be granted
entry by ACME North Security. These visitors must be escorted at all times by employees.
Most engineers work in their designated cubicle offices. These “cubes” are made up of
prefabricated walls that are 9 x 9 feet and 6 feet tall with one opening for entry/egress. There is
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some sense of privacy but other around you can easily hear your phone calls and conversations.
Each engineer is assigned one or more computers in the cube depending whether one needs a
desktop as well as a workstation to do engineering. Most cubes are sparse with two desks and
two chairs. The second chair is usually for other engineers during technical discussions or
personal visits. Managers are provided a walled office that provides more privacy. I work in a
manager’s office. Groups are engineering and management offices are scattered all over the
building rather than grouped into one area.
There is a central cafeteria that opens for breakfast and lunch where hot meals,
sandwiches, salads and soups are made available for sale. The company provides free coffee and
it seems like engineers drink a lot of coffee. Most engineers work from seven AM to four-thirty
PM with 30 minutes for lunch. This is called a 9/80 work schedule where one works a total of
80 hours in 9 work-days; this allows for an off-Friday every two weeks. I like this schedule
better than the 40 hours every week. Occasionally, I have to put in extra time at work.
Engineering is considered a professional career and therefore overtime pay, unless authorized by
management, is not provided.
Most engineers are given an assignment and schedule to meet. There is considerable
discourse in engineering to ensure that the design is right and that it will work as intended.
Designs may be peer-reviewed and/or stakeholder-reviewed. At a peer review, usually
conducted on software code and drawings, a few other engineers will give you feedback on
issues; there usually is no brainstorming for solution. At a stakeholder review, the document or
drawing will be reviewed with management, customers, and other subject matter experts with
discussions and brainstorming of solutions. The product design is conducted in accordance with
the general development process provided in Chapter 1, Section 2.
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ACME South. ACME South has the same building structures but without the single roof
because the weather conditions in the south are not as drastic. Since the ages of the buildings are
the same as the ones at ACME North, it also has a very old and worn out look typical of the
plants that were built during World War II. Engineers work in cubes similar to the ones at
ACME North. They also require security identification badges to enter the premises. One main
difference is that the engineering cubes and offices are collocated into one building, which turns
out to be the furthest building from the production area, making it a chore to get to the other
working parts of the factory. The overall feel is a sense of sparseness similar to ACME North
since there is an abundance of unused space that seems to dwarf the actual amount of work being
carried. The ACME South engineers work the same 9/80 schedule and share common processes
and procedures with ACME North.
Hero Engineer Mark M. I have known Mark M for over 22 years. He has over 33 years of
experience at ACME North and has been the Catapult Program Manager ever since I have
known him. He has a mechanical engineering degree from the Milwaukee School of
Engineering and a Masters of Business degree from the University of Minnesota. He is very
detailed oriented and tends to worry about everything, sometime to a fault. Extremely intelligent
and hard-working, he is also very tenacious and usually gets things his way by raising major
issues and presenting his case. He likes to vocalize his ideas and loves a good discussion. He is
passionate about his job and is probably a workaholic because he spends a lot of time at work
and then goes home and works from home. He is a very nice guy once you get to know him. He
is considered demanding by some, but he is consistent in this behavior. He is detail oriented and
makes thought-through decisions. He is married and has one adult daughter. He often has a very
concerned look about him and a frantic disposition.
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To show his nature and his commitment to work, he told me how much he enjoys fishing
and boating and puts his boat on a local lake every summer. However, due to his work habits, he
ends up being on the boat no more than four times a year; often only when he puts the boat to
water in late spring and when he pulls it out for dry docking in the fall. He is trim and looks at
least 10 years younger than his age. He wears fashionable designer clothes and when asked, he
tells us that he wears anything his wife purchases for him. He exercises and eats right since there
is always fruit in his office, and he brings packed lunches. He has 10 lower level manager
reports and has control over 70 engineering and support personnel.
Hero Engineer Mel G. Mel G is a senior level engineer and was working at ACME North when
I started in 1992. However, we worked on different project, and our paths did not cross until I
interviewed him for this case study. He has an excellent reputation with other senior level
engineers that I closely work with. He was born in Iowa and worked for CMC in Iowa City
before moving to ACME North in 1985. He spent 15 years at ACME North, and then moved to
ACME South where he has been for the last 18 years. He is about 59 years old. He is very
heavy set and with a slight beard.
He has a shy demeanor and a soft-spoken voice. He is usually dressed in chinos and
dress shirt. He has a kind face and a very inviting disposition but considers himself to be a loner.
He moved his family to the South when he took a job at ACME South and loves living in the
south since he never adjusted to the very cold weather in the north. He once told me that cold
weather was a waste of time. He is an avid golfer and loves to watch sports on television. He
volunteers as a coach at high-school level robotics competitions.
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF ACME
History of ACME North
In this chapter, I will summarize the history of the two ACME business units. I will also
show that the relationship between the two business units goes all the way back to 1941. ACME
North has a very rich history in the Midwest region of U.S.A. In 1924, John Blackstock (a
pseudonym) joined the Midwest Pump Company as a civil engineer. Born in Texas and with a
degree in civil engineering from Cornell (1921), he had come to the Midwest to join up with
Food Company Inc. A few years later, he joined up with Midwest Pump Company (a
pseudonym). Midwest Pump was a very small company with about 50 employees that sold
water pump equipment for firefighting. He was brash, creative, and was always thinking about
improvements to existing systems. In 1928, he sold an invention to Midwest Pump for a
controlling interest in the company and became the company’s president. In 1932, Blackstock
landed a contract to manufacture submersible pumps and other hydraulic equipment for the U.S.
Navy. Midwest Pump started to grow and took on more employees.
In 1940, the U.S. government started a massive rearmament program in anticipation of
engagement since most of Europe was already at war. Blackstock convinced the Navy to give
him the contract for building anti-aircraft guns. He thought that the Midwest region was perfect
for the job since there were many highly skilled machinists in the vicinity. To do the work,
Blackstock purchased a 350-acre site (Kenny, 2005) to build a giant factory. He even had his
own private airport adjacent to the plant and created a wholly incorporated business called
Midwest Ordnance to fulfill government contracts. The initial set of buildings was constructed
in just over two months. Figure 5 (see Figure 5) shows some of the hardware produced by the
Midwest Pump Company, predecessor of ACME North.
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In 1941, parts of the factory were converted to a Government Owned, Contractor
Operated (GOCO) facility. As a GOCO facility, the property was owned by the government and
operated by Midwest Ordnance; therefore, there was joint ownership of the whole factory. By
this time, the location had around 4,000 employees.
The Navy was very happy with the work and awarded Blackstock additional contracts for
manufacturing large-caliber navy guns. These life-time relationships that Blackstock established
with the U.S. Navy still plays a significant role, and ACME North continues to be the go-to place
for U.S. Naval guns and other weapon systems. At the height of the war in 1943, total
employment at the plant was over 11,000.
That same year, the company received its first Navy “E” - an award for excellence, and
went on to earn five more “E” awards in the ensuing years. The Navy “E” and five stars painted
on its smokestack stand as testament to those early honors and remind the employees of their
past work performance and dedication
to the U.S. Navy. This factory is one
of eight in the nation given this
maximum number of six excellence
awards. The Navy “E” awards were
only granted during World War II.
The atmosphere was typical of
what you would find at a skunk-work

Figure 5. Large components being prepared for
assembly in 1942 (Library of congress, 2014)

in conjunction with efficient, state-ofthe-art manufacturing. Innovation and creativity were highly regarded and rewarded. This
environment attracted many mavericks and tinkerers that were similar to Blackstock. In
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reflection, the successful and highly-regarded managers have all been cocky, brassy, and largerthan-life types.
The main workforce was made-up of engineers and machinists. However, the focus was
to hire the very best and brightest that management could find. Groups of engineers were
structured around their functional discipline but assigned to specific project where they could
contribute and learn from senior engineers. Mentorship was expected and provided with longterm personal and business growth in mind.
The plant continued to produce guns for the U.S. Navy after the war and moved on to
other weapon systems. In 1964, Blackstock sold the company to a conglomerate called
Chemical Machinery Company (CMC) (a pseudonym). CMC also purchased other defense
companies and combined them into a defense business sector. Though CMC’s main interest was
in industrial chemicals, it saw the opportunity to increase profit and cash flow by purchasing
small defense companies and pooling them into a cohesive group. This combining led to more
work including U.S. Army development projects. In 1994, CMC pooled its entire defense group
and merged it with Barsco’s BMY defense holding to create a joint subsidiary called United
Industries (a pseudonym).
History of ACME South
During this research, I was surprised to learn that ACME South was constructed in 1941
and was designed to be very similar to the ACME North. In a way, it was logical to set-up the
two locations in unison since one was going to build the naval guns and the other was going to
do all the repair, maintenance, and overhaul of the guns that were to be built at ACME North.
These were twin plants – one in the North and the other in the South. Figure 6 (see Figure 6)
shows the depiction of the ACME South plant in 1987.
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ACME South is the same age as the ACME North plant, from the beginning of
WWII. Both the plants look exactly the same in layout and everything except
everything is under one roof at ACME North so that the weather does not
interfere with the work. The ACME South plant was actually added on more
building than the ACME North plant. They had over 500 employees at one time
with three shifts. ACME South took on a lot of different things. Most of it was
overhaul, new gun barrel production, etc. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, a national emergency was declared
and the defense department pressed for additional ordnance production factories. In July 1940,
Congress appropriated monies, and the defense department researched over two hundred sites
that offered the advantages of inland location, adequate labor supply, and good transportation
connections. Naval Ordnance Station (a pseudonym) (NOS), later to become ACME South, was
one of five sites selected for the location of an inland Naval facility (Furer, 1959). This was a
strategic call by the Navy, and not the championing of any one individual to place this facility
inland rather than on the coast to protect repair and refurbishing capabilities.
NOS was built on 142 acres with a total 1.5 million square feet of building space. The
factory was commissioned as a Naval Shore Establishment to provide shore support for
operating forces. The factory was contracted to Westinghouse Electric Corporation and mainly
served as a repair depot. At its peak, NOS employed about 4,200 employees working on navy
equipment, including the guns built at ACME North.
NOS was the epicenter of U.S. Naval gun repair. During World War II, U.S. Navy fire
power increased by ten-fold and caused significant demand for gun parts, repairs, and
refurbishing. The Westinghouse contract expired in 1946, and NOS went back to Navy control.
By this time, employment had reduced to approximately 500, and these employees were
converted to civil service status (instead of remaining service Navy personnel). During the
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Korean War, employment did go up to 1,800 but again, was considerably reduced after the
Korean and Vietnam wars.
By the 1990s, NOS was the only surviving factory that provided overhauling,
engineering, and support services to the U.S. Navy’s surface weapons systems including some
anti-ship missile defense systems. Further reductions took place post-Cold War. In 1993, due to
access capacity and underutilization, NOS because an ideal candidate for Base Reduction and
Consolidation (BRAC), a U.S. government program aimed at closing various bases and
government owned facilities to reduce costs. NOS survived the cuts but the local city
government saw this as a future problem and started building a case for privatizing and not
outright closing it down. This would allow employees to remain and would remove the burden
from the Navy and continue to be a viable presence in the local community. If NOS was closed
down, the community stood to lose over 1,200 jobs (NSOL and city support).

Figure 6. Example of Naval Ordnance Station Plant
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Unlike Blackstock from ACME North, there is no evidence that there was any one single
individual that created and championed NOS. After the NOS was placed back into Navy
management in 1946, it was led by a string of Navy captains. By all accounts, these were
competent leaders assigned to a shore command that typically lasted three years. After the three
years, they were re-assigned to other leadership positions in the U.S. Navy. These shore
commands were barely tolerated by these captains and not welcome since time-on-water offers
more leadership training and keeps one on-track for advancement. Only five internal employee
newsletters are available for public review between September 1973 and January 1992; these
newsletters show at least five different base commanders within this 19-year period. Typical
shore assignments last about 3 years; this is insufficient time to develop, implement, and see the
results of leadership application. This could possibly mean the civilian managers below the
captains were the leaders of NOS and guided the business through the good and the rough times.
Using defense industry terminology, NOS falls under “sustaining” (or supporting role)
rather than “creating” (or new product development) that is the ACME North environment. In
both ACME North and ACME South cases the work determined the behavior. ACME North
developed a more “skunk works” mentality with innovation, speed, and highly skilled machinist
working hand in hand with engineers with the goal to be creative, develop new products, grow
the business, and make profit. ACME South (or NOS) was run as a repair depot (low tech) with
set processes and procedures that required a by-the-book mentality. NOS‘s goal was to meet the
U.S. Navy’s needs in repair and refurbishment of established weapons regardless of profit, cost,
and schedule.
Though NOS was a Navy base, most employees were civilian and made-up of tradesmen
like machinists and technicians; there were a few engineers. Their main task was to repair and
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refurbish existing navy weapons including guns and short-range missile launchers. This type of
work required methodical and by-the-book temperament. These workers were the maintainers
and technicians, and not the engineers or creators of products. Another factor to consider is that
in some cases they were repairing equipment that was over 30-years old and often one or two
generation-old technology.
Common History between ACME North and ACME South
The two business units have worked together since 1941 but have always had an
acrimonious and competitive relationship even when they were under different ownership. Field
and repair problems with the ACME North manufactured guns were blamed on ACME North
rather than typical wear and tear of the heavily used weapons. Likewise, ACME North workers
were convinced that the Navy was wasting money on NOS when ACME North could build and
repair the guns at a lower cost.

Midwest Pump Co (ACME North)
Chemical Machinary Corporation (CMC)
Other Defense
Other Defense
United Industries
Other Defense
Barsco BMY Holdings
Other Defense
Other
Venture Investments
Naval Ordnance Station (NOS) (ACME South)
Other Defense
ACME
Royalty Ordance
Bevis Corporation
Other Defense
Haug Defense
Vick Corporation
Other Defense
1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

Figure 7. Midwest Pump Co. to ACME Evolution

2010s
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Figure 7 (see Figure 7) provides a diagrammatic view of the various combinations,
purchases, joint-ventures and buyout of AMCE North (Midwest Pump Co.) and ACME South
(the former Naval Ordnance Station). As mentioned before, these types of changing corporate
relationships are common to the industry. A review of any major defense contractor’s pedigree
would show a similar diagram.
1985 to 1995: The Post Cold-War Era
The relationship between the two businesses changed around 1985 and became more
competitive. This added competition would continue to reverberate even when the business units
are united. Things got very problematic for the future ACME South since ACME North
aggressively lobbied to shut them down. This would sour the relationship for a very long time
and contributed to many issues when the two businesses were combined. The relationship
during this era is well documented in a Naval Law Review article (Render, 1997).
When the Cold War had ended and the Reagan defense buildup was over, significant cost
reductions were implemented. The U.S. was faced with excess military capacity (Render, 1997).
There was considerable pressure on the Pentagon from the U.S. government and private industry
to reduce defense spending either by conversion (transitioning government owned defense work
to private industry) or outright shutting down military bases. Defense contractors lobbied
Congress to shut down bases and to develop new products in order to reduce cost-cutting impact
on them. The Pentagon knew that many military installations should be closed merely because
they were unnecessary to the national defense; however, this was no simple task (Render, 1997).
Over the years, it became painfully obvious closing military operations was
no simple task. Presidents from Nixon to Clinton have been accused of
having at least one eye on their domestic political interests when making base
closure decisions. Military bases significantly impact the community's
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economy. Not only are military, civilian, and contractor personnel salaries
spent in the community, the government installation itself generates a host of
other businesses that sell goods and services. Therefore, local business,
political, and labor leaders generally do not want such facilities closed or
moved. (Render, 1997, p. 245).
ACME North, owned by CMC at that time, lobbied for the U.S. Navy to outright give up
its control of NOS to ACME North as part of continued economic conversion from government
ownership to privatization. ACME North claimed that not only could it do the work but that it
would be done efficiently and with better quality. The U.S. Navy was faced with a dilemma.
Although the workload at NOS [ACME South] declined in volume during
the five years prior to its privatization, the nature of its work remained
essential to the national defense effort. Although parts of the work can be
completed in many different locations. [ACME South] is a unique Place
because no other single location in the United States can completely rebuild
Navy guns and missile launchers. In order to rebuild these weapons safely
and efficiently, it is necessary for substantially all of the work to be
completed at one location having all the required processes and capabilities.
The Navy remained unwavering in its position on this point, even after the
1995 round of base closures. The gun repair and missile launcher work done
at [ACME South] would be done somewhere. The only question is whether
it would be done by federal employees at [ACME South] or at some other
government installation; by a private contractor occupying ACME South
after transfer to the [city and county] Redevelopment Authority; or by a
private contractor's facility at another location. (Render, 1997, p. 254).
In 1991, the U.S. Navy estimated that it would cost $200 million to close NOS as a
government installation and hire a private contractor to perform the same work. Washington
rejected ACME North’s plan and NOS was not placed on the base closure list for 1991.
During the next round of base closures in 1993, NOS was not originally on the DoD’s
closure list; however, ACME North lobbied hard to close NOS. ACME North felt that it was
unfair to have to bid for contracts against NOS since NOS, as a government-run facility, had
rates that were subsidized by the American taxpayers and did not reflect “true” costs. Moreover,
ACME North argued that the Navy had 100 times the capacity that it needed. ACME North,
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therefore, wanted the Navy to shut down NOS and transfer all NOS workload to ACME North.
ACME North’s campaign failed and NOS survived the 1993 base closure round.
Naval Ordnance was not originally on the DoD's closure list in 1993.
However, [CMC], [ACME South’s] gun repair competitor, induced the
Commission to place Naval Ordnance on the closure list. An internal [CMC]
memo dated March 16, 1993 written by James Orr, a high ranking official in
that company, states the company's reasons for wanting to acquire the work
currently being done at [ACME South]. He referred to [ACME South] as the
"Evil Empire." Orr continued, "It is certainly frustrating and discouraging for
[ACME South] to have totally avoided the DoD list .... It is us or them!! The
marketplace is not big enough for both of us." This memo also suggests
pressuring the Navy as much as possible to close Naval Ordnance. (Render,
1997, p. 256).
In preparation for the next round of base closures in 1995, CMC continued to apply
pressure on the U.S. government and the DoD. CMC generated a lot of press by complaining
that the government was keeping too much work (Render, 1997). CMC also started discussions
with the city and county commissions to convince them that base closure was imminent.
In 1994, the local politicians met with Navy officials in Washington D.C. and, unless
something changed, the decision was that NOS would be closed in 1995. The local politicians
and business representatives became convinced the best course of action in the 1995 round
would be to urge the Navy to permit the privatization of [NOS] (Render, 1997). Rather than
fight the forces of closure, they changed their tactics to privatization of NOS.
However, some NOS employees believe CMC pressured the Navy into
closing NOS. They feel the Navy violated the law and internal regulations
by "cooking" the data to justify a closure decision and agreeing to
privatization so [South City] politicians would not protest too loudly.
(Render, 1997, p. 260).
In early 1995, several employees of NOS complained to the Inspector General of the
Navy, and an official investigation begun. The investigation found that higher echelon officials
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had changed or excluded cost data without justification and supporting documentation (Render,
1997).
In 1995, NOS was again placed on a closure list. However, this time around the city
government was prepared to influence the outcome and quickly convinced CMC that it would be
beneficial to buy out the whole gun business without a public/private setup. This way, one
company would outright own the manufacturing as well as the repair of naval guns. This is a
very rare event in the defense industry and is called Privatization-in-Place. In May 1995, South
City and South State convinced Congress and the Navy that NOS would be kept viable and
active in the community by splitting NOS four ways with parts of it going to CMC (for gun
repair), Ray Missile Company (a pseudonym) (for missile systems repair), the Navy, and the city
government of South City. This was highly supported by the South State’s congressional
delegation and everyone saw this as a win-win situation.
On June 1, 1995, the city and county leaders signed a memorandum of agreement with
CMC dealing with ACME South. The plan was to have DoD recommend privatization of NOS
and transfer the ownership of the land and buildings to the City and County Redevelopment
Authority, a non-profit agency.
CMC would be hired as contractors to operate the gun repair and refurbishing. It was
expected that many of the employees would be retained and would become CMC employees.
…. "Privatization" [of ACME South] is nothing short of the federal
government making a gift of a unique multi-million dollar factory to the
[Redevelopment Authority]. Why should the federal government give away
the capability? Why should [South City], as opposed to the entire country, be
the beneficiary of this gift? The main beneficiary of the gift could be the
defense contractors. Why not sell Naval Ordnance with all of its equipment
to the contractors at its fair cash value if they are so anxious to do the work?
(Render, 1997, p. 282).
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However, when the time came for completing the privatization-in-place, the South City
government wanted more concessions, and at the last minute, decided to open up competition for
ownership of NOS. According to the city, the buyer had to own the factory, be a leader and
contributor in the community, grow the business, add more products, and create jobs. This was
more than what ACME was willing to offer but was very concerned that the repair business
could end up in the hands of a competitor. Another defense contractor doing the repairs would
allow them a foothold into the design and manufacture of future naval guns. To protect turf,
ACME reluctantly agreed to the deal. As part of the deal, ACME North was to not compete for
any of the work previously allocated to NOS. On completion of the deal, approximately 350
employees transitioned from Navy civilian employees to corporate employees. The station
changed names from NOS to ACME South.
1995 to 1996: The Marriage between ACME North and ACME South
ACME Corporate organized for ACME South to be managed by and run through ACME
North. Basically, ACME North would replace the Navy leadership and take over the employeesupport infrastructure (Human Resource, Security, Safety, etc.). The initial transition was
difficult, and the company struggled to increase productivity and to add additional employees per
the agreement. ACME decided that it would faithfully meet all terms of the agreement. The
business hired about 30 engineering employees that would become the ACME South design and
engineering team. Unfortunately, they were hired without any workload or assignments. This
led to many of them showing -up without any work to do.
Though the productivity of ACME South continued to increase with use of new processes
and procedures on the repair side of the business, engineering utilization suffered. “Utilization”
is the percentage of charges to a direct Navy contract or commonly called direct-charge. A
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defense company can only bill the government for direct-charges. For example, if an engineer
works 100 hours and charges 80 hours to a direct charge number, and 20 hours to training and
vacation, utilization is 80%.
In order to make sure these newly hired ACME South engineers had work, project and
program managers at ACME North were tasked to send their on-going work to these new
engineers. Unfortunately, ACME South had the wrong mix of engineers; where the ACME
North projects needed experienced engineers with specific and specialized product development
skills, majority of these newly hired engineers were inexperienced and had general instead of
specific skills. This was not the problem of the engineers hired; it seems ACME South managers
hired the skills typified by past work, of repair and sustainment, rather than the new
responsibility of product development.
The employees at ACME North were concerned that management wanted to send their
work to ACME South and would often simply ignore top management’s request to re-assign
work. Additionally, it took more management time and skill to break-up work between multiple
business units. The responsibility of running the ACME South plant was transitioning properly
but the work was not moving to ACME South as quickly as desired by management. To
accelerate this move of engineering work to ACME South, management took a drastic action to
reduce head count at ACME North and about 20 engineers were laid-off. They were laid-off
even though there was sufficient backlog of engineering hours and high utilization. These
management decisions did not help with the already contentious relationship between the two
engineering communities. The engineers and managers felt punished for not sending work to
ACME South.
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ACME South was the first such privatization-in-place. On August 19, 1996, the location
was officially turned over to CMC. New CMC management from ACME North was installed at
ACME South. This was a very difficult and acrimonious transition; many leaders from the U.S.
Navy, U.S. Congress, state, and city leaders were in attendance at the transition ceremony to
convey the importance of the location to the local community and the U.S. Navy. The city
leaders clearly also wanted to demonstrate to CMC its commitment to the continuation of ACME
South. Here are some comments extracted from speeches to demonstrate their continued support
of the ACME South (CMC Employee Newsletter, 1996).
One of the constants that has followed this facility through its 55 years has
been change. The mission has changed time and time again and the economy
has changed. You have always met these changes. (Governor P).
When everything is said and done, you have made a difference and you will
continue to make a difference. (Assistant Secretary of the Navy).
It is the men and women here today whose excellence, service, commitment,
and skills made the difference in keeping this facility open. The bottom line
is that history doesn't stop. This isn't the end of history. We are now turning
the page and starting a new chapter in the history of this facility. (South City
Mayor).
You should feel good about how far you've come, and your future is even
brighter. Today is a new beginning for the gunsmith of the Navy. As you
move to become the Gun Center of Excellence with your partners in industry,
you should stand tall and proud. (Vice admiral and commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command).

ACME North management and engineering staff were very aware of this political influence;
however, this influence empowered the ACME South engineers to be less responsive to the
needs of management located at ACME North. Barry O and David L, the present managers of
some ACME South engineers, had this to say:
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We have very good political support down there [at ACME South]. We keep
them because they provide a lot of political support in Washington. Their
long history tells us that they are untouchable. (Barry O. Personal Interview,
2011).
ACME South has capable engineers, mainly local people and a few that have
transferred from ACME North. In the past, the work we sent to ACME
South resulted in low-quality output. As a group, the ACME South engineers
have developed a sense of entitlement since they know the political situation
keep them in their jobs regardless of their effort and quality of their output.
(David L, Personal Interview, 2010).
I provide recent history of the relationship and more details on the two projects in
Chapter 5. I will describe ACME corporate habitus and power structure in the next section.
ACME Corporate Habitus and Corporate Power
Corporate habitus, or the application of class habitus to ACME North and ACME South,
provides a good means to compare and contrast the two business units. ACME North corporate
habitus is directly related to the new products development and the cult of personalities that are
selected to lead the business unit. ACME North attempts to not only please the customer but to
“wow” them. The ACME North work is high-paced, more quality-focused, and requires hightech competency. Design change and injection of emerging technologies are a constant.
Maverick behavior that supports product development is valued and rewarded.
At ACME South, the corporate habitus is related to the maintenance and the steady-as-itgoes leadership provided by the Navy. Product maintenance offers a fairly repetitive work.
Though technical, it is considered more a trade rather than a profession. Individualist behavior is
tolerated at lower levels. But in most cases, such maverick behavior could negatively impact the
maintenance of the product, and may also cause safety and product performance concerns.
ACME South’s corporate habitus is more influenced not by the individual leaders, but the
work that supports the daily responsibilities of the U.S. Navy. It was this “working hand-in-hand
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with the Navy” that determined the corporate habitus of ACME South. Additionally, ACME
South was remade by adding new work and moving in work from other ACME business units.
Over time, ACME South adjusted its corporate and individual habitus to accommodate the work.
Both ACME South and ACME North seem fairly well balanced with exceptional
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital, though for different reasons. Their longevity
and struggles to survive shows exceptional strength, fortitude, and ability to re-invent
themselves. Table 5 (see Table 5) provides a summary of the various powers as associated with
each location.
Table 5. Compare and contrast various capital for ACME South and ACME North
Types of Capital

ACME South

ACME North

Economic

Rich – Viable through the years and
provides a required service to the
U.S. Navy.

Rich – The go-to place for Navy
weapons delivery systems.

Cultural

Rich - Only business with expertise
and tools to repair aging but
important systems. Added
production capabilities.

Rich - Expertise in new weapons
delivery systems design and
development. Only business with
specific specialty engineering skills.

Rich - Strong local government and
state government support. Strong
congressional support under
opportunity and wealth distribution
agenda. Cost savings and ability to
take on additional production work
is attracting more attention from
ACME leadership.

Middle – Good relationship with the
U.S. Navy. Cost of business is high;
ACME management always looking
for ways cut costs. Has limited
local, state, and congressional
support.

Rich - Directly contributes to Navy
and weapons systems readiness.

Rich – Six excellence awards but
this was over 70 years ago.

(legitimate
knowledge)
Social
(valued social
relationships)

Symbolic (honor
and prestige)
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Both business units also had sound social capital (valued social relationships), within
each business unit and with the U.S. Navy as demonstrated by their ability to take-on and
complete work and their successes as businesses. The same goes for symbolic power (i.e., honor
and prestige) where both had high levels of honor in order to survive the defense environment of
cost cutting and closures. Buildings and landmarks are also symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977).
They become landmarks because they have symbolic value. This provides cultural meaning and
environment as sense of prestige; this prestige is then converted [or added] to symbolic power of
the individuals in the environment. Considering that buildings have symbolic capital, it is no
wonder that ACME North is held in such high regards due to the highest number of excellence
awards receive by one of eight such factories in our country.
Considering symbolic capital at the individual level, a defense engineer’s training,
experience, personality, and know-how can all be considered part of one’s symbolic capital that
can be packaged to achieve their technical goals. Also as an engineer moves from one project to
another, accumulated symbolic capital can be leveraged for prestige and honor. However, one
can just as easily lose symbolic capital if they do not deliver.
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CHAPTER 4: MY EXPERIENCE AS A DEFENSE ENGINEER
In this chapter I will provide my personal background, how I got into engineering, my
experiences at ACME, and expand on the meaning of a professional reputation of a defense
engineer.
Personal Background
I have an inquisitive nature and am constantly investigating how things work. I also
enjoy discovering things. As a child, I often took apart my dad’s old radios and other equipment
to learn about them and attempt to repair or make them better. More often than not, I made
things worse but enjoyed the occasional or off-chance success, and learned how to handle
electricity and standard electrical components. I enjoyed all the natural science-based classes in
school, and mathematics was my favorite subject. In third grade, I suspected that there was a
relationship between the angles and the length of the sides of a right triangle and tried very hard
to “discover” the equation on my own; only to learn about the 2,500 year-old Pythagorean
Theorem a few months later- what an “ah-a!” moment.
As a sophomore in high school, I was selected to join a small group to learn calculus.
The class was taught by a charismatic Mr. Shah. He was well spoken and very enthusiastic
about mathematics and teaching. At the end of every class, he would reserve 10 minutes for
students to ask him difficult and challenging questions. He would always start his answers by
saying, “That is so easy!” and then walking us through the answer process. Years later,
whenever I took a mathematics or engineering exam, I would find myself muttering the same
words as I delved into the answers. The challenging nature of mathematics, my overall
enjoyment of the subject, and the positive influence of Mr. Shah, pointed me towards a career in
theoretical mathematics.
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After high school, I continued towards this goal; however, there were not many
opportunities for research in theoretical mathematics (besides teaching, which did not then
interest me). These opportunities also required post graduate education that I had no means to
achieve. So I looked for a career that was mathematics oriented, personally and technically
challenging, and fun (or at least my idea of fun). Engineering was the perfect fit. I could
leverage my mathematic skills, the work would be technically challenging, and it was a
professional, well-paid, career. As it is, engineering is considered “applied mathematics.” The
big question was, “What type of engineering and what specialty?”
I talked to working engineers to get an idea of the kinds of things they did and what they
enjoyed most. They all gave me positive personal narratives and details about various types of
engineers. After much consideration and mulling over the pros and cons, I decided that I would
pursue a degree in electrical engineering with a focus on analog electronic circuits. The analog
circuits would give me the technical and “mathematic-related” challenge that would satisfy my
original intent.
I studied electrical engineering at Michigan Technological University and graduated with
a bachelor’s degree. A few weeks after graduating, I moved to Arizona and started working at a
small design engineering company as a junior engineer working on designing Larger Scale
Integrated Circuits (LSIC) and Very Larger Scale Integrated Circuits (VLSIC); these are
commonly known as circuit chips (a good example is a microprocessor chip). After a few years,
I moved on to designing and testing hybrid circuits. Hybrid circuit chips are packaged like
circuit chips but also have additional other electronic components in a single miniature package
(for example, a hybrid circuit specialized in detecting weather conditions would have a
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microprocessor chip, some sensors, and some data storage components). Hybrid chips are
typically used on products that require miniaturization and high reliability.
I then joined a defense company as a design engineer to develop military and civilian
aircraft electronic controllers. This is where I learned more about being an effective defense
engineer. About 22 years ago I moved to North State and joined up with CMC, the predecessor
to ACME. I started as a test engineer and progressed to Sr. Staff Systems Engineer. My
experience also allowed me to take on some mechanical engineering and software engineering
tasks. About 10 years ago, I changed over to systems engineering. Systems engineering is the
interdisciplinary and over-arching activity that manages all the systems and subsystem
engineering of the complete systems over its life-cycle. I am presently the Integrated Product
Team (IPT) Systems Lead for a major product line for ACME North. I love my job especially
the opportunity to solve problems and the chance to collaborate with others.
Before taking on the role of systems engineer, I worked on the management side of the
business as the Electrical Engineering Functional Manager. I moved back to the engineering
side to be closer to product design and development. There is anecdotal evidence that in the
defense business one has the chance to experience no more than two major projects that have the
perfect mix of personnel, talent, experience, and management to bring to successful conclusion.
So far, I have experienced five such major projects, a point of gratitude and pride for me. All
these projects have led to follow-on production and continued work for our business. As my
career has progressed, I find myself spending less and less time with mathematics and technical
analysis, which is usually left to junior engineers or specialists. However, the desired challenges
of theoretical mathematics are now replaced with the challenges of managing the whole system,
mentoring others, and developing creative technical and managerial solutions.

PHRONESIS IN DEFENSE ENGINEERING

91

While working in Arizona, I earned my Masters in Business Administration. After
joining ACME North, I completed my Master’s Degree in Software Systems. In my overall
career as an engineer, I have experienced eight major layoffs, or Reduction in Force (RIF) as
commonly called in the industry. Of these eight, I was personally terminated in two of these
RIFs and had to move on to other companies. It was a more stressful experience to witness my
friends and co-workers being shown the door than personally experiencing the layoffs. I also
learned that one can be terminated despite a stellar professional reputation. Despite this periodic
chaos in the business, I have enjoyed my career very much and am proud to be a defense
engineer. I consider myself a typical engineer.
My Experience at ACME North
When I joined ACME North in January 1992, there were about two thousand employees
at this location. Prior to my joining, and due to typical industry churning, the business unit had
gone through significant reductions in the late 1980s, and I was one of few that were hired into
the company in the early 1990s. From 1992 to 2000, the number of employees increased to
2,500.
I started at ACME North as a test engineer for the development of automated test
equipment. My Arizona work experience allowed me to immediately provide state-of-the-art
solutions. Over time, this effort led to more test equipment requests from the U.S. Navy
customer and a new product line for the company. I was then promoted to manage a small group
of electrical engineers assigned to a product line. I enjoyed the management challenges but
missed the details of the design and development. After a few years, I took the opportunity to
join a new development project as the project’s lead electrical engineer. A few years after that, I
was approached by the director of engineering to become the electrical engineering department
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manager of ACME North. In this position, I was responsible for providing personnel, processes,
tools, and expertise to all the projects at ACME North. At one time, I was responsible for over
130 electrical engineers. Of these, six of my reports were at ACME South.
As the electrical engineering manager, I held monthly telecom meetings with the ACME
South engineers and travelled to visit with them about twice a year. The mismatch in needs and
their limited skills took significant effort to manage. Though it was the responsibility of projects
to send the work to ACME South, I did all I could to encourage project leaders to send their
work. We had a senior manager, Dave H assigned to finding work for these engineers. Dave H
and I would have weekly meetings to discuss and find work that could be successfully completed
by these new engineers.
I sent some department work, but they did not have the skills or the experience to write
processes and procedures. Upper management provided these ACME South engineers with a
special charge number to use in case of lack of work. Over time, I noticed most of the engineers
were charging full-time to this special number, simply, they were doing nothing.
As mentioned before, I encouraged project managers to send their work to ACME South
but in most cases I was told there was no work to send. Since the engineers already had the
special charge number and work was not necessary. Everyone knew that this was an ‘overhead”
number and that meant the charges could not be passed on to any of our customers and was
negatively impacting profit. Most project leaders saw this as cost of keeping competition out of
our gun business. I got to know Mark M. when I worked with him to send some electrical
engineering gun work design to ACME south. He was one of few project managers who were
willing to send work to ACME South. I also noticed high absenteeism, increase in sick leave,
detachment from meetings and work, and reduced quality of work from ACME South engineers.
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This was a sharp contrast to the engineers at ACME North who were vibrant, engaged, and
driven. How could one company have such disparities?
After four years as department manager, I switched back to the design and development
side. Since I had project and funding responsibilities, I would carve out work for the ACME
South engineers on my projects, and I was very satisfied with their work; however, due to limited
scope and funds, this effort was for a few of these engineers and not the remainder of the ACME
South engineers. The ACME South engineers I worked with were competent, capable, driven,
and they delivered quality, on-time work. In some cases, these engineers travelled to ACME
North to closely work with their counterparts. Some even spent many weeks with us at ACME
North to complete their work.
Through these years I had continued to develop my systems engineering skills, and in
2010 I was promoted to lead systems engineer for a large product line. In this position, I get the
right combination of management, systems engineering, and design and development experience.
My Experiences During the Various Eras at ACME North
CMC Era. ACME North has undergone significant changes during my 22-year career at the
business unit. The location has gone through four different owners: CMC, United Industries,
Venture Investment (a pseudonym), and ACME. I joined the company during its “renaissance”
days when it was run by CMC. In the early 1990s, the business was just coming out of the major
cost reduction of the Reagan buildup. CMC, a major industrial chemicals provider, had a very
hands-off corporation that provided component leadership mainly because defense was not a
core part of its corporate charter. Each business unit was a profit centers; therefore, CMC was
hands-off and rewarding if you met or exceeded your mark. CMC added to the Midwest Pump’s
“Lone Wolf” culture and successfully combined it with competent, post- Blackstock leadership.
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The management structure was a combination of promotions from within and new talent added
into the mix. This leadership increased production, added more engineering, and bid for more
work than previous administration. Employee education and well-being was encouraged. Friday
dress code was flexed to allow jeans. Engineering initiatives, adventurism (or risk taking), and
efficiency was highly encouraged and rewarded. The business was also successfully transitioned
from mainly a production factory to a mainly engineering company (with limited
manufacturing).
In 1992, the whole plant was jam-packed with manufacturing equipment and had two
production shifts. By 1995, the production lines were down to one shift and one-tenth of the
previous capacity. However, engineering was on the rise. I was one of the first in the plant to
get a personal computer since I was involved in software design for my test equipment project.
There were computers in the plant but they were mainly for shared purposes in allocated
computer rooms. Due to the success of my test equipment project, I was recognized at various
meetings as well as awarded recognition for outstanding work. I travelled to various customer
sites and navy locations to attend design meetings, product tests, and technical investigations. I
was given all the tools I requested. We had social gatherings, prizes, parties, and celebrations to
develop a strong group identity. Each business unit managed their own HR, Program
Management, Engineering Management, Production, factory management, IT, Security, finance,
and engineering support.
I enjoyed the CMC days as a vey care-free time full of adventures, hard work, learning
the business, and personal and group rewards. As a junior engineer and a young manager, I had
more freedoms to accomplish my tasks and had others to help me remove any barriers in my way
of completing my tasks. I also was given everything I requested to improve my products,
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increase my efficiency, and experiment with new tools and equipment. I was also surrounded by
many competent and capable workers that have remained my friends to this day
United Industries Era. When CMC combined its defense holding with Barsco to form United
Industries, the leadership for the newly formed group was established in Washington D.C. and
many of the leaders were selected from ACME North. This helped established ACME North as
the place to mine for future leadership. With United Industries came a big focus on winning
proposals and increasing productivity. This led to a reorganization from a mainly matrix focused
organization to a program centric structure. Each business unit was again considered to be a
profit center and allowed to manage all aspects of their own business. This method allowed for
various businesses to be sold, exchanged, shuttered, and added into the company without too
much disruption. The downside was the extra cost of supporting all aspects of the business at
each of the locations. Top management was mainly from promotions within.
During this era, ACME North established itself as the location for engineering excellence
and many programs were successfully completed. However, as the electrical engineering
department head, I faced many challenges including reduced funding for training, corporate level
restrictions on hiring when we were faced with engineering backlog, and the daily grind of
dealing with employee and management issues. Though this was more related to my job and not
the overall United Industries’ way of business, my overall sentiment is one of significant
personal growth, insufficient time to do all that I wanted, and many unsatisfying times. There
were also some good experiences especially doubling the size of the electrical engineering group.
It was during this era that ACME South joined into the ACME North business group.
Venture Investments Era. Venture Investment bought out all of United Industries and pumped
money into improved infrastructure, new tools for management and technology, and processes
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for efficiency. Venture Investment was a hedge fund run by various government and high-tech
leaders that had significant knowledge of the defense business. The plan was to get high returns
by streamlining, removing redundancies, increasing intra-company sharing of resources such as
production. The culture remained the same as United Industries and leadership was mainly from
inside growth. There was continued effort to reduce bureaucracy. This era was one of continued
accomplishments for me. I had adequate management experience and had good knowledge of
the business. I continued to be recognized as a problem solver and capable of completing my
assignments. Further consolidation moved Finance and IT to shared functions across the various
businesses. From initial purchase to sale, there was a four-fold increase in value of United
Industries under Venture Investment.
The implementation of project Catapult was during this era and my personal sentiments
regarding ACME South were less than favorable. I had bought into the culture clash and was
very opposed to sending significant work from the North to South. This was a common
sentiment at ACME North, and I was unduly influenced by the grinding competition that had
previously existed between the two. Like many others around me, I was unable to grasp the new
situation, or that these types of changes were typical to the industry. I also considered the move
as a sacrifice of jobs at ACME North.
The initial problems and issues faced by project Catapult validate my opinion that the
move was a disaster. However, I was wrong in the long term. The move allowed for ACME
South to reinforce and legitimize its importance to the overall well-being of the product line.
The lower cost also allowed for more products to be purchased by our customer and resulted in
even more work for ACME South. Once the system was fully established in the U.S. Navy,
foreign Navy customers also purchased the system adding new workload and additional cost-
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savings. I consider my initial opinion on this as an emotional response. I missed the leadership
moment.
ACME Era. ACME purchase did not bring any changes right away. However, the company
leadership in Washington D.C. was completely gutted and new top management brought in from
outside the business and overseas. ACME purchased the business at the height of the defense
market. Reorganization in 2009 completely changed the structure from program-centric to a
remote-management organization. Since ACME was a foreign owned company, it reminded me
of how colonies were ruled through remote bureaucracy, top down decision making, and
outsiders making decisions without getting to first know our business and culture. This
restructure led to the rise of the “bourgeoisie” not only at the head office in Washington D.C. but
also at ACME North. Part of the distributed management structure was to assign enough middle
managers in the various locations to support the management structure. This was done in a way
that did not recognize the most competent managers.
The ACME era further removed any capabilities for the businesses to stand on their own.
HR, engineering management, program management, safety, security, and support systems were
all combined across the ACME enterprise and redistributed throughout the U.S. This means that
each of the businesses do not have the capability to stand on their own and have to rely on
remote locations to provide that support. This would also mean that each of the ACME
businesses is no longer attractive to other defense companies and venture capital since they
would have to set up full services prior to purchase. This leads to two options for ACME if the
business fails – send more work to it from other locations (reminiscent of North-South
relationship) or shut-down the place. To date, ACME has had to shutter six locations in the last
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few years. Partly due to the organization setup of interdependence, they are unable to splinter off
and sell these individual businesses to other defense contractors.
The new organization also led to a significant rise in overhead costs, and therefore a
reduction in profit. The vice president in charge of the restructure was summarily moved to the
corner office and many working jobs were cut in order to accommodate the demotions of some
middle managers. The restructure continues to haunt all aspects of the business. One example is
the remote focus on efficiency reduced any capability to take on additional work. We just don’t
have any spare engineers available to take on any new work. It now takes more effort and up to
four months to bring in a new engineer. Having experienced continued change in the industry, I
take this as just another adjustment and take the time to reflect on the good outcomes and the
follies of management. Other cost-cutting and profit-increasing measures have included reduced
pay increases, demotions in rank (and therefore pay), and restricted training.
One unintended result of all this internal churning is that the present makeup of the
engineering group at ACME North is exceptional since only the resilient have remained. With
continued layoffs and heavy focus on productivity, the folks remaining in the system are highly
capable and some of the best I have worked with. It has also meant with lack in direct or close
management, most of us have developed a more independent way of accomplishing our work
without involving managers. This has led to less dependence on the bureaucracy and more on
informal groups and personal contacts. Despite lack in leadership, the work still gets completed
due to self-directed workers.
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The Engineering and Management Experiences of Hero Engineers
Both our subject engineers have significant engineering and career experiences. It was
very difficult to have them talk about themselves. Here Mel G describes his round-about way of
ending up at ACME South. Notice his serious undertaking of the commitments we had made as
part of the purchasing agreement:
I am a senior project engineer. Graduated from U of Illinois and worked for
CMC in Iowa City, Iowa. I moved to [North City] in 1982 to join up with
this division; was about 20 years old and worked missile launchers and gun
systems.
In 1996 timeframe when we privatized ACME South, I moved to ACME
South in order to satisfy the commitment to start an engineering department
there. At that time the project I was on an Army project and the project
consented to move [a small project] to ACME South. One of their conditions
was to have someone from ACME North go to ACME South to help
transition and help work at project. My name came up to do that and I was
happy since to do that. I don’t have that many ties here in this area and
having come up here from Illinois, ACME South was closer to that.
I went to ACME South to work the [Army] project. Was there for a year and
a half for that task and when the time came for me to come back, I was
approached by Mark M, program engineering manager for Catapult to take a
job with him and remain at ACME South. So I have been there ever since.
Though some organization changes at ACME South and when one of the
managers was let go, the overall management setup was split up into two
positions and me and Tom B. When Tom retired, I took up the whole
responsibility and now I am the engineering manager of ACME South. (Mel
G, Personal Interview, 2011).
Mel G describes his amorphous role and himself but refusing to recognize his leadership:
It is kind of confusing situation. Technically all of the ACME South
engineers do not work for me. With the distributed management system [ i.e.
the Cheese Wheel structure], they all report to other functional managers that
are not at ACME South but all over the place including ACME North,
Michigan, California, and Pennsylvania.
They don’t even report to me on the technical side since they have their
project leads typically at ACME North. I still am somewhat responsible to
making sure they are busy, that everyone is getting attention. Not to get
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deeply involved with their detailed work but give them guidance and
direction. Help coordinate with ACME North personnel.
I am a very reluctant leader. I enjoy the work but I do not like to
performance appraisal and all the bureaucratic work but I like teaching and
helping the younger folks. The leadership thing is something that I have not
sought out. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
I will describe the cheese wheel structure before I get back to Mel G. The 2009
reorganization was called the “cheese wheel organization structure” by the ACME North
engineers. The organization diagrams made no logical sense. In a way, it was taking the remote
management setup between ACME North and ACME South and applying that to the whole
ACME corporation. The issues between ACME North and ACME South were now being
amplified across the whole ACME corporation.
Though it is against his nature to be social, Mel G demonstrates his willing to be flexible
when it comes to being available, helping junior engineers, mentoring the kids in First Robotics:
Most people consider me not a very social person and I will admit that. I
don’t like large groups of people. I play golf. My family has a hard time
sometime even getting me to talk to them. So helping younger folks is
something that I like. I do the First Robotics things with kids. I am not very
social but am flexible when I need to be especially when sharing and
teaching.
But I make myself available to everyone. My door is always open. I put
everything aside to take care of them and talk through things. (Mel G,
Personal Interview, 2011).
Here he recognizes the need for experience rather than titles when he talks about what he
sees around him. He understands that it takes time and experience to build wisdom:
A lot of engineers are more people oriented and they may be more looking
for the next opportunity. In my case the opportunities found me though my
hard work; I do not go searching for the next big thing. That is one the main
struggles for me are the people who are looking to fill the next position rather
than just do their job right. I think if you did your job right, the opportunities
will come. Rise to the top by doing your very best not just shuttling around

PHRONESIS IN DEFENSE ENGINEERING

form one job to the other for advancement reasons.
Interview, 2011).

101

(Mel G, Personal

A Defense Engineer’s Professional Reputation
A defense engineer, like all other workers, has to navigate through many personal
challenges and pitfalls. As one navigates through these challenges and continues to gather the
experiences, defense engineering becomes an integral part of one’s being. In this section, I
describe my own history and experience as a defense engineer. I then describe what it takes to
develop a defense engineer’s reputation. According to Goffman (1961) each professional
reputation, and behind this, each self, occurs within the confines of an institutional system. The
professional reputation in this sense is not a property of the person to whom it is attributed, but
dwells rather in the pattern of social control that is exerted in connection with the person by
himself and those around him. Recalling Goffman’s (1961) professional reputation from
Chapter 1 and the experiences one encounters in its development, I believe all the experiences
outlined in figure 4 (see figure 4) also apply to the development of a professional reputation in
defense engineering.
At ACME North, I can best describe the growth of an engineer as the accumulation of
professional reputation chits or the collection of good engineering deeds that lead to a more liaise
faire environment for accomplishing your assigned work. This is the building up of
independence by earning the confidence of management so that one can choose how to
accomplish one’s goals without oversight or criticism from others.
A Defense Engineer’s Typical Habitus
Bourdieu (1997) describes habitus as the mental and cognitive structures used to deal with the
world, internalized methods, and internalized structures. Levering this, Nguyen (1998) general
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description of an engineer and my personal experience, I developed the following description of
a typical defense engineer and a defense engineer’s typical class habitus:


Is a problem solver with the desire to bring concepts to fruition.



Has a highly developed mental equity in area of specialty, science and general
engineering.



Has a linear, structured, and reasoned thinking to define, interpret, evaluate, and
judge.



Is detail-oriented and a team player.



Is highly inquisitive about science and technology.



Is future-oriented with positive outlook.



Has low impulse-reaction; ability to work on projects for long periods of duration and
propensity to think things through before taking action.

 Could have difficulties communicating with non-technical, emotive, or non-linear
thinking other.
A Defense Engineer’s Typical Class Habitus
Class habitus for a typical defense engineer is:


Middle class upbringing, male, highly educated, conscientious, and continued learner
through personal and technical challenges.



Be at ease in navigating the engineering world but may have a sense of awkwardness
in other social fields.



Thinking everything can be explained scientifically and that mathematical models can
be developed to closely simulate the real world.



Thinking they are engineering for a better world.
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A defense Engineer’s Capital
A defense engineer’s capital is accumulated through various means. Type of capital and the
means to achieving are provided in Table 6 (see Table 6).
Table 6. Types of Engineering Capital
Types of Capital

Means

Economic

- Progressing through the ranks to higher titles with
more responsibilities

- Cultural
- (legitimate knowledge)

- Engineering degree(s)
- Defense Engineering experience
- Past successes

- Social
- (valued social relationships)

- Association with respected mentors, managers, and
other engineers
- Ability contribute to the progress and well-being of
one’s team
- Ability to help others when called upon

Symbolic (honor and prestige)

- Recognition awards at team, business unit, and
corporate levels
- Promotions
- Honorable mention in company literature
- Number of years at one place of work
- Monetary awards

Engineering and the Perfect Project
The desire of defense engineers is to participate in the perfect project. This perfect project is the
combination of honest (Goffman, 1959) and hard work, right collection of supportive and
contributing team members, supportive management with balanced cost, schedule, and quality
focus. Concluding with a successful product is one that not only meets but exceeds expectations.
A perfect project is and emotionally charged environment, with heightened awareness, and
moments like Durkheimian high social events. This is “the great chase” most of us want but
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CHAPTER 5: CONDITIONS FOR THE RISE OF PHRONESIS
In this section I will continue with recent history and document the environment that
precipitated heroic action and phronesis. Remembering that ACME North and ACME South
have a “poor cousin” relationship, I will use that and the transition of the two projects to ACME
South as a background to demonstrate that the two hero engineers applied phronesis. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, Mark M is the Program Manager of the Catapult project and Mel G is a
senior level engineer, formerly from ACME North and now working at ACME South. To recall
from Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, phronesis is translated as prudence, moral intuition and practical
wisdom. Flyvbjerg (2008) adds that an expert is one who operates with phronesis.
An expert … operates from tacit skills which are skills that are characterized
by the highest level of the learning process. …..and commonly called
practical consciousness. (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 35).
In Aristotle’s words, phronesis is a “true state, reasoned, and capable of action
with regard to things that are good or bad for man.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 2).
…phronesis emphasizes practical knowledge and practical ethics. Phronesis
is often translated as “prudence or practical common sense.” (Flyvbjerg,
2008, p. 56).
Intuition is the ability to draw directly on one’s own experience – bodily,
emotional, intellectual –and to recognize similarities between these experiences
and new situations. Intuition is internalized; it is part of the individual.
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.21).
Both hero engineers, Mark M and Mel G, demonstrated their ability beyond just scientific
and technical thinking. They seem to understand that this was a social and moral issue that
required a non-scientific approach. This is the central theme of phronesis in that social subjects
are best solved by the public deliberation and not by science (Flyvbjerg, 2008). Since
engineering is about applying mathematical and scientific rules, many in the field become
jaundiced into thinking science can solve everything, including social and management issues.
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A good example of a non-phronesis act is the hiring of large numbers of personnel before
award of contract. This was neither a scientific nor phronetic decision.
We had a catch-22; we had to hire the people so we would be ready when the
projects came along. At the same time you hire people you do not have work
for. There was a long time when bad habits were set. They did not have a lot
of work to do; they were not used to doing a lot. They surfed the web all day
long; spend a lot of time on the phone. When I first got here, there was no
one who put in a full day’s worth of work. (Mel G, Personal Interview,
2011).
Another example of non- phronesis is ACME North firing their engineers to force
managers to send work to ACME South despite more than adequate work for both business units.
However, after the layoff, the work still did not move to ACME South.
We were anticipating the Future Gun (a pseudonym) program to be awarded
to us, so we hired all the ACME South engineers. However, the program
was awarded to [our competitor] and we now had additional engineers we did
not know what to do with.
More than 50% of the ACME South engineers do not have any work [as of
2010]. We had to reduce [or lay off] ACME North personnel to see if we
could send that [surplus] work to ACME South but even then we did not
fully utilize ACME South [engineering]. (David L, Personal Interview,
2010).
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the dismal condition of the relationship between ACME
North and ACME South was the result of years of contentious relationships between the two
business units that magnified after their uniting. The purchase deal also added pressure on
ACME North to demonstrate good faith but the actions were ill-thought and premature (Render,
1997).
The Challenges and Upturn of ACME South
With the privatization of ACME South, also came various commitments that initially
seemed minor but came to dominate the relationship between the two business units. These
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commitments were stipulated in the privatization contract and constantly monitored by South
City and the state’s congressional senator. One such commitment was to provide more
engineering and production work at ACME South to keep the business viable. In 1998, Mark M
volunteered to transition his Catapult production from ACME North to ACME South. He saw
this as a logical choice since ACME South already had significant equipment and tooling
capability that came with privatization, and ACME South personnel were already familiar with
repair and refurbishing of the Catapult equipment. This would also take up some unused
production capacity at ACME South.
Another advantage was the cost saving from the reduction in high-paid union workers at
ACME North. This was the opportunity to break the production workers’ union stronghold at
ACME North. Due to high wages and union concessions, ACME North was one of the more
expensive locations for production. This move would decimate the ranks of union production
workers and eliminate the Auto Workers Union, a partner for over 60 years, at ACME North.
The big change was that we moved the production line to ACME South.
Within the first few years we moved all assembly and test functions to
ACME South. A lot of the parts fabrication was still at ACME North but
over time, all of that either contracted out or brought to ACME South.
When we went into the second generation Catapult production, we started up
at ACME South. Since that was very successful, we did the same for thirdgeneration Catapult. After that, all new production will now be at ACME
South. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
In the long run, ACME North became the design and development center of excellence
and ACME South became the production center of excellence. In the next few subsections, I
will describe some missed leadership opportunities.
More engineers than needed. As part of the privatization agreement, ACME North
management was asked to determine the future number of engineers at ACME South. They
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would then have to hire and retain these new engineers. It was decided that there should be 50
engineers at ACME South.
My understanding of this is that there were about 100 people working
Catapult [at ACME North]. My boss, the director of Navy Programs said we
should put half that [number] in ACME South. (Mark M, Catapult Program
Manager. Personal Interview, 2011).
Though there was a graduated timeline for hiring these engineers, many were hired
immediately upon completion of the agreement to demonstrate CMC management’s commitment
to the deal. However, there was no work available for these new engineers and finding
appropriate work turned out to be a challenge for mid-level managers at ACME North. This also
demonstrated the conditions and the dilemmas of the whole industry.
We had a catch-22; we had to hire the people so we would be ready when the
projects came along. At the same time you don’t want hire if you do not
have work. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
When Mark M was asked on attempts to put these engineers to work:
[It did] not [work out] very well (laughs). Dave H, a manager reporting to
the Director of Navy Programs was assigned to take care of transitioning the
work to ACME South. He had the responsibility but no authority to go back
to the individual program managers [like me] to say this, this, and this jobs
are now moving to ACME South. Most program managers like me were not
willing to move parts of our programs to ACME South. So Dave H was not
able to get to those numbers. No one said to us program managers “You
shall do this! We are moving work to ACME South and make it happen!”
(Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
I remember this time since I was the functional Electrical Engineering Manager, and the
electrical engineers hired at ACME South were always in need of work. Dave H and I would
have weekly meetings to find the right type of work for these engineers. The ACME South
engineers did some work for me in the early years, and I was very satisfied with their work;
however, this effort was a small effort of limited duration. The engineers I worked with were
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competent, capable, driven, and they delivered quality, on-time work. In some cases, these
engineers travelled to ACME North to closely work with their counterparts. In a few cases, these
engineers spent many weeks with us at ACME North to complete their work. Positive
experiences with ACME South engineers seem to have gotten lost in the focused attention on a
few failures. These failures were then translated to the whole ACME South organization as
unworthy.
The move of the Catapult production line to ACME South provided work for 12 of these
loss-leader engineers with production support work. However, more than half the group was still
significantly under-utilized.
So we were always trying to nibble away at the work at ACME North [and
send it south] to better engage the ACME South engineers. I was concerned
that since the Catapult program was used to determine the number, I was
going to have to do the most transferring of work. This meant loosing
ACME North people that were doing very good work for me. So we tried to
nibble away at it but were never very successful at that. (Mark M, Personal
Interview, 2011).
The real challenge was to give them direct-charge work (see section 3) [so
that they would not impact profits]. This has been the challenge ever since
the organization existed down there. The utilization was about 80% when I
took over then it dipped into the low 70s and then we brought it back up to
upper 80s and lower 90s. It is one of those things that require constant
pushing and managing because by default people do not send work to ACME
South. (Barry O, Personal Interview, 2011).
ACME South has lost four engineers in the last RIF. This is the first time
that we laid off people there. We were 32 down these and now down to 28.
At ACME North we would RIF poor performers and keep nothing but the
best. Unfortunately, that is not what we have done at ACME South where
we saw even worst performance. Only recently did we start laying off poor
performers at ACME south –even then, it is a very rare case. (Barry O,
Personal Interview, 2011).
We never got to the point of 50 engineers at ACME South. The original
commitment was 50. Over the years, people have played that number
differently because we eventually reach the point that if we combine logistics
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engineering with ACME South engineering, it would be greater than 50.
(Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
Wrong engineering skills. Top management had also hired engineers without involving any of
the functional or project managers to find out what skills were needed for ACME South.
Therefore, they hired inexperienced, production support, and generalist engineers when the
business needs were for experienced, design and development specialists in defense hardware
and technologies.
… most of the folks here do not believe ACME South has the same quality
engineering as we do at ACME North. I think we have to be very selective
about the work we move down there.
Since we did not send enough people from North to South, [there] is limited
mentoring of these engineers. They don’t seem to know what it takes to do
good engineering.
…. There are two different levels of people at ACME South. The few people
that were engaged were delivering but the majority looked at managers to do
everything for them and put the work in their hands for them to do the work.
Even then, they wanted managers to make every decision and had no skin in
the game.
I had to tell many of them that they were part of the solution and to quit
talking about us manager as unable to work it out and how stupid we are.
….always complaining that they did not get enough support from
management. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
Us and them. Since ACME North had an engineering group made up of more than 350
engineers of various disciplines, it did not need too many outsiders to help with design and
development. Any communication, under this circumstance, was as simple as walking over to
the desk of another engineer and getting the help needed. They also had easy access to
management. As a result, most did not develop the skills to work outside their “four walls.”
With the new relationship, these engineers were now asked to work with “outsiders,” and many
simply did not know how to do this. Additionally, previous effort by top management to
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vilifying ACME South was still lingering in the system and many ACME North employees,
including middle management, still believed in the outdated negative rhetoric. This further
decayed the relationship between the two business units and developed an “us and them” culture
on both sides.
We forget that the ACME North engineers are easy to organize because most
have been around for a long time and know what needs to be done.
Management is also available and within reach. At ACME South, we have
always had to feed them work and it makes for a very time-consuming
management activity that we are not used to doing.
For the longest time, there are three of four of us here who struggle daily to
find work for the ACME South folks. We treated them more like a contract
engineering house; more like an extension of ourselves [but not part of us].
I did not see the drive in ACME South people to get things done. When I
was responsible for them, I used to go down there and kick some butt to keep
things moving. I’m not sure enough of that is happening any more.
They just don’t seem to have the motivation and so people here [at ACME
North] were reluctant to engage or deal with them. If you went to a contract
house to get your work done, you make a deal and they deliver or don’t get
paid. This is not the same at ACME South.
Even today, there is still the same mix of good and bad engineers [at ACME
South]. There are a few that we can easily work with but the others have an
us-and-them mentality. These ACME South engineers never got along with
ACME North management; they blame everything on us. Maybe looking
back we should have done a better job of uniting the two locations. (Mark
M, Personal Interview, 2011).
This meant that all the good engineering work remained at ACME North and the
leftovers – the ones emphasizing drudgery and boring work - went to ACME South. Mark M
uses “selective” as a euphemism for the simple, uninteresting and unexciting work. This showed
the hierarchy established by ACME North.
If you are selective about what you put down there, it works. They are good
on the mechanical, OK on the cabling stuff. If you need any software or
electrical circuit board design it does not work. (Mark M, Personal
Interview, 2011).
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Surprisingly, unrelated subjects such as the salaries paid to the ACME South engineers
also caused animosity between the workers of the two business units. AMCE North engineers
were irate because ACME South engineers were getting the same wages. This was petty since
ACME North wages were not impacted. However, it demonstrated a perceived hierarchy by the
ACME North engineers. This also shows frustration on Barry O’s part since it is his
responsibility to find and channel work to the ACME South engineers.
We have some very interesting folks down there. They know they cannot be
fired due to the privatization agreement and are happy to remain underutilized. They have one of the best gigs in the entire city. Up until last year,
they were paid the same scales as us [ACME North] and we all know that the
cost of living in South City in a lot lower than what it is for us [in the north].
(Barry O, Personal Interview, 2011).
As to why these challenges continue to fester,
Some of it is related to [their] egos – [ACME South engineers think] we
know better and no one can teach us any better. [On the ACME North side,
it is] ignorance and not knowing what the ACME South engineers are
capable of doing. Over time due to the nature of the business, ACME North
has gone through many reduction in Force (RIF) and has lost a lot of great
engineering capability; this means that the remaining [ACME North]
engineers (which is about 40% of where we used to be five years ago) are
extremely capable and the very best that we can retain. (Barry O, Personal
Interview, 2011).
Both Mark M and Mel G were able to transcend this us-and-them mentality because they
took the effort to know the ACME South engineers. To most at ACME North, these engineers
were faceless names that could be easily objectified, but not to Mark M and Mel G. Though both
were frustrated with ACME South engineers, they did not give up on them and saw a future
where the two sides worked together. They saw the system as the problem and not the engineers.
I must admit I was part of the us-and-them crowd and looked upon ACME South as
competition. I now recognize that I was mistakenly influenced by the system and did not fully
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grasp the nature of the hero engineers and what they were trying to accomplish. I was unaware
of the changing environment that the hero engineers were very quick to recognize. If I had the
maturity, I would have recognized that the hero engineers were attempting to “elevate all boats.”
Fractured management. ACME middle and upper management were also not of a single mind
on how to successfully implement an engineering group at ACME South. Mark M dismantled
the organization his predecessor had set up.
It was Dave H for a few years [who managed the ACME South engineers];
then I took over [to make sure there was engineering work at ACME South].
In my opinion, Dave H was trying to recreate ACME North engineering at
ACME South. He wanted a whole engineering organization at ACME South
like what we have at ACME North. I thought it would not work because it
would take about 300 people minimum to have a complete, viable, and selfsustaining engineering organization with its respective departments and
managers at ACME South. We could not do that, there just was not that
amount of work.
My attitude was that we were here for two reasons. We support production
because that is what we do down there and we are here to support the fleet;
part of logistics and in-service engineering.
When I took over, I restructured ACME South and focused the engineers
towards strictly mechanical and electrical engineering work. I told them to
be generalists and not specialists [capable of doing a variety of things and not
necessarily relaying upon one specific expertise]. This way they could do
many things. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
Besides direction, there also seems to be a void in communication flow-down from
ACME corporate leadership.
The main problem was communication. It was not flowing from the top
down and seems to be an ACME wide problem so looking at the situation
between ACME North and ACME South should be looked at as a greater
ACME issue rather than just the two business units.
No one at the corporate level is driving this communication and team work –
even now. I saw a friend who works for a rival company and he told me that
if ACME business units could [work together] ACME would be dangerous
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for the rest of us in the industry. We just don’t know how to effectively work
together. (Barry O, Personal Interview, 2011).
Only select managers were held responsible for utilizing these ACME South engineers.
When we changed the organization in 2009, and I no longer had the
responsibility, it led to a very strained relationship with ACME South
because I lost the visibility on the progress on my project. My project could
be jeopardized if ACME South did not deliver.
It was even worse when trying to drum up work [for ACME South] outside
of my program. It led to some bitter and strained relationships with my
management peers. Some managers just did not want to help out and it
caused me a lot of headaches because top management was just not fairly
distributing the pain. They should have said this is a huge objective and we
need to keep the ACME South folks fully engaged and utilized. That was not
getting flowed down [to middle management]. (Mark M, Personal Interview,
2011).
As for why upper management did not get involved, I believe that these ACME South
engineers were considered “loss-leaders.”
There was millions of dollars incentive to buy out ACME South. I don’t
know why top management did not want any involvement to make it work.
South never got the attention it needed. I thought it was a big deal to keep
ACME South working and utilized but it was not a big deal to top
management.
I think top management thinks it is fixed enough with some “Band-Aids.”
(Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
I do not believe that ACME North management intentionally acted contrary to the benefit
of the whole system; they simply did not know what to do and were exasperated by the lack of
success in implementing scientific and technical solutions to this human integration problem.
ACME North management realized they did not have all the power and they had very
little influence and control over the ACME South employees. It also showed the power shift due
to the contractual agreements and the involvement of various third parties (U.S. congress, South
State, and South City) that had vested interests in the well-being of ACME South employees.
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Simply, the power in the relationship was shared with others that may have diminished the
legitimacy of the managers at AMCE North.
Applying Bourdieu’s (1990b) various types of capital to the situation shows the complex
relationships that come about when evaluated through economic, social (relationships), cultural
(legitimate knowledge), and symbolic (honor and prestige) capital. The conflict between the two
business units came about from management not recognizing and leveraging the social, cultural,
and symbolic capital that each business unit brought to the relationship.
Mel G and Mark M rose above despite the chaos in the system. They took the
opportunity to leverage their social, cultural, and symbolic power to improve the system
(increase engineering utilization) and empower (rather than marginalize) the disenfranchised.
The paths taken by Mel G and Mark M were risky since they both went against the norm and in
different direction from their peers. In a way, the two heroes navigated through the hardship
their peers were unwilling to undertake to implement their ideas and plans for ACME South.
Both Mark M and Mel G had significant cultural (legitimate knowledge), social (valued social
relationships developed with ACME South engineers), and symbolic (honor and prestige earned
through leadership action) capital. However, Mel G, Mark M. and their accumulated capital was
unknown or unrecognized by ACME’s top management.
Top management’s behavior may also provide an opportunity to apply total institution to
ACME as presented by Goffman (1961). To recall from Chapter 1 that some total institutions
have a significant split between those with highly prized responsibilities and privileges and the
various other groups. This could be applied to the conditions at ACME since top management
took the liberty to unilaterally reorganize regardless of impact to others. I now see this act as a
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desperate attempt to fortify their powers; but it backfired since they did not have background or
knowledge of the business they were tasked to lead.
Unstable Organization. During this period, the organization went through significant changes.
In 1997, CMC sold its defense holdings to Venture Investment Group, a Washington D.C. based
investment bank (see Error! Reference source not found.). Venture Investment streamlined
and cut costs across the board to increase profitability and in 2001, Venture Investment took the
holdings public but retained major share. In 2005, foreign-based but U.S. subsidiary, ACME
Systems bought out all interests and merged it with their other U.S. businesses. Each successive
ownership change brought about another round of reorganizing and cost-cutting. In 2001, Mark
M took over the responsibilities for the ACME South engineers from his predecessor Dave H
and moved away from the earlier plans and visions.
…this was in 2001 reorganization that made our ACME North organization
more project-focused and less of a matrix. I moved ACME South away from
recreating a full up engineering organization. (Mark M, Personal Interview,
2011).
The New Reality
Inconsistent workload, organization instability, and low engineering utilization continued
to be issues for ACME South. To overcome some of this, Mark M moved a very large chunk of
work that was being done by his logistics group at ACME North. This workload included the
writing and managing of operational, maintenance, and training manuals for the Catapult project.
This Reverse Colonize project meant reduction in capability at ACME North but Mark M saw
this as a natural fit at ACME South and would better use the available personnel.
How [Reverse Colonize] came about was that in 2006 when Mark M was in
charge of ACME South engineering, he also had the ACME North logistics
group and he made it happen. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
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Most program managers were not willing to [send work to ACME south and]
risk the tight budgets and schedules of their projects. So after that, I decided
that we should move the Logistics group [to ACME South] to help with the
numbers.
The reason for this move was that the Navy’s in-service engineering was
already down there and they were closely related to the peer side activities.
Colonize was low risk, they were already working very closely with ACME
South. We felt this was low risk. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
It was decided that various new positions would be created at ACME South to do this.
We basically said to ACME South, “You are now the logistics center of
ACME”. From now on, there will be no more logistics work at ACME
North.
Most of my management peers did not agree with me. This did not stop us
since this solution would also better streamline the logistics process. We
hired 12 logistics specialists and a manager at ACME South and I move all
the work that we had from the north. Since then, we have taken on more
Reverse Colonize work and it takes up more of our ACME South people. I
don’t remember the exact number but there is more work than before from
the U.S. Navy. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
This also added to our engineering workload at ACME South since the
logistics group needed engineers for tech checks, to provide graphics, and to
help them with training sessions. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
With the transition of Catapult and Reverse Colonize projects completed, fine tuning was
still underway but overall heading in the right direction with higher engineering utilization.
However, everything went back to chaos in 2009, a very pivotal year for both Mark M and Mel
G. Due to a complete, top-down reorganization, Mark M was stripped of his responsibilities for
ACME South and reduced to only being the program manager of the Catapult program. Mark M
believed that he was heading in the right direction with the ACME South engineers and the
reorganization in 2009 seems to have left him a little bitter. He was not allowed to complete his
vision. However, his implementation of the reverse Colonize project was a complete success.
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When [ACME came] in 2009, we again reorganized into technology teams
[back matrix-heavy organization]. I was no longer responsible for them and
went back to just my program manager position. The ACME South logistics
employees fell under Readiness and Sustainment side of our overall business
and the rest [of ACME South engineering] was fractured and redistributed
into other technology teams.
I no longer had the large number of ACME North and ACME South
personnel as part of my organization. Now all the workers were split
amongst other functional and specialty managers in the cheese wheel (see
Chapter 4).
This changed my relationship with the folks at ACME South. Now I don’t
go down there at all since I am no longer in charge of the people. I don’t
have to train them, redirect them or anything. Now it is back to the Dave H
way where the people who do not have any workload themselves are
responsible or making sure the ACME South engineers are gainfully
working. We are back to where we were before. If these managers don’t
have any workload themselves, how can they help ACME South? (Mark M,
Personal Interview, 2011).
One other thing is the ACME South engineering issue and how we work
between the various facilities. The distributed management aspect is more
cumbersome and less effective and does not work. This method did not work
between our two business units; ACME took that bad model and applied it to
the whole organization. Go figure, they did not look in their own back yard
to see if that was a good thing to do. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
The 2009 reorganization seems to still haunt everyone. The main concept for this new
management structure was to reduce overhead costs by creating a super-matrix, borderless
structured organization at the highest level and without any product line, function, business unit,
or state boundaries. At ACME North, this was commonly referred to as the “Cheese-wheel
organization” (see Chapter 4). The fracturing of the organization was not done at individual site
level but it took everyone from seven major engineering locations and split them into technology
groups. The technology groups were also arbitrary and lacked any intuitive structure. Most of
us had never seen such a haphazard organization even in theory. This was stove-piping at
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extreme; easy to manage but difficult to get anything done without involving many across
various sites.
The new 2009 ACME organization [further] reduced the relationship
between ACME North and ACME South. Now it is managed by distributed
team [with management and workers scattered all over the U.S.]. Everyone
has a bit of ownership but not the overall [responsibility]. (Jason A, Personal
Interview, 2010).
In essence, the way the two business units was previously organized, with ACME South
engineers reporting to someone at ACME North, was now the corporate-wide method of
managing engineering personnel. This meant that an engineer’s immediate manger is most likely
located in another ACME business unit. The new organization was to reduce over-head cost
(and therefore, increase profit); however, the amount of effort to design and implement, and the
managing of the chaos actually made things worse. Many of the new managers did not even
have the necessary skills or knowledge of their assigned technology or specialty. In 2011, the
president of the company was summarily removed and another reorganization was announced
(Bernhardt, 2012).
The 2009 reorganization distributed all the ACME South engineers amongst five
different managers so that the responsibility for finding work would also be distributed; however,
the split was arbitrary and some of these new managers were caught off-guard. Barry O was one
such manager.
But we also fight the greater organization. This idea of borderless
engineering concept that was part of the 2009 reorganization does not work
because you or I would rather walk down the hall to get the help we need
rather than reach across a thousand miles to unfamiliar faces. The
collaborative nature of our engineering and the distances between our
engineers does not allow us to work together very well. Also, we are not
good at managing work beyond our walls. (Barry O, Personal Interview,
2011).
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Distributed management is “no leadership.” (Mel G, Personal Interview,
2011).
What Worked. Through all of these issues, there is evidence that some things are being turned
around. Mark M’s idea of moving larger chunks of work rather than piecemeal to ACME South
seems to be the right means to keep the engineers engaged. There is also additional confidence
that ACME South engineers are more capable than originally perceived. Mark M and Mel G had
worked closely together to bring this about. As for the type of work that is presently done at
ACME South:
[They are doing] production support, logistics and fleet support, we gave
them all the engineering interface work and various design projects. So they
are now doing many pieces within the whole new program. We also have
some project engineers working for us down there to manage and coordinate
the work. There project engineers are not within my organization but report
technical progress to me. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
ACME South as the center of production excellence continues to succeed. There are
currently between five and seven major production programs added to ACME South since the
privatization and more production transfer to the site is expected. Reverse Colonize is also a
success with all at ACME as well as our Navy customer recognizing ACME South as the
experts.
The transition of production support worked very well. We were able to put
a few people down there and we transitioned production support to them is
stages and gave them more and more responsibility over time. The test
support, production support, logistics is going okay. (Mark M, Personal
Interview, 2011).
[We have also taken over] production of some specialty systems [from
ACME North]. We also bid for and won some Army work that is totally
different from anything ACME South or ACME North has done before. It is
high value with lots of units. It is being run directly out of ACME South.
If we add any more manufacturing we will add more people. This is more
than what anyone expected. There is no secret that the production side of
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ACME South is growing. According to all the things going on, we expect a
lot more work. Frankly, I am not sure where we are going to put them all.
(Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
The Reverse Colonize team has a huge and stable workload. They do not
have to manage the folks at the level that we do to scrounge up the work.
They know they have work around the corner; [on the engineering side] we
never know if there is any work for us in the future. (Mel G, Personal
Interview, 2011).
The segregated tasks between the two business units and the unfruitful reorganizations
have led to a further decline in teambuilding. I believe together the two business units would be
a formidable force in the defense business.
No one at the corporate level is driving this communication and team work. I
saw a friend who works for a rival company and he told me that if ACME
business units could work together ACME would be dangerous for the rest of
us. We just don’t know how to effectively work together. (Barry O,
Personal Interview, 2011).
As for the type of future work for ACME South,
Forget the small bits; send the whole program including management over
there. I think they would do a very successful job. I think they are not given
the opportunity to do this. We insist on keeping the management here. As
long as we do not give them a large project for their own, we will have to
continue to do piecemeal. They are never given the opportunity to have a
real program. (Barry O, Personal Interview, 2011).
However, Mel G has his doubts that a complete program will ever be sent to ACME
South.
There may be one thing that is missing and that is project engineering skills
to help manage the projects. I think we could do the project if one was sent
to us. I don’t think they will ever send anything like that to us. (Mel G,
Personal Interview, 2011).
Let me start by saying that earlier on, a decision was made to not provide
heavy analytical type of engineering work here. Because that is a specialized
skill. As far as the basic engineering skills, we have them. We have had
engineers work here for a long time and know how to get things done. They
just have not had the opportunity to do it. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
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Sadly, Mark M and Mel G were neither recognized nor rewarded for all their hard work
and achievements in changing the ACME South engineering group from a liability to a viable,
responsible, and productive group.
Despite the chaos, ACME South has continued to re-invent itself. New leadership
benefited from the low cost of ACME South work and the increased engineering utilization after
the efforts of Mark M and Mel G. One other positive is the corporate recognition of ACME
South as the center of production excellence. This is important because ACME South is now
well placed to take over the design and development of the next generation products.
Many of the top managers that brought about these chaotic changes of 2009 are no longer
with ACME. Most were fired or moved to corner offices never to be seen again. However, the
impact of this change still resonates negatively in the system. New top management has come in
and another round of reorganization is expected. The cycle continues.
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CHAPTER 6: TWO PHORENETIC EMPOWERED PRACTITIONERS
“Phronesis is what permits one to chase away false opinions and make good
decisions.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 110).

In this chapter, I will analyze the professional reputations of Mark M and Mel G. I will
also evaluate the power in the system and apply Flyvbjerg’s and Bourdieu’s description of power
to better understand the system. I will close this chapter with my personal reflection on the
experiences of Mark M and Mel G.
Analysis of Power and Professional Reputations
Both Mark M and Mel G had demonstrated personal power and well developed
professional reputations that allowed them to grasp the opportunities to improve the system.
They risked their reputations by going against the grain; they encountered resistance, ridicule,
and setbacks. Ultimately, when everything was beginning to go right, they were pulled from
their responsibilities.
However, in the long run, these were minor sacrifices. Both broke through the
established rules and processes their cohorts were under in order to find unique and viable
solutions to the overall problems of under-utilization. Likewise, it is through reflective action
they were able to implement their visions since there was no previous precedence to their
actions. Unlike others in the system, they took on their responsibility to ACME South with
conscience consideration for others, with a sense of duty. The experiences of hero engineers
shows there are often opportunities to not only improve the systems and build personal expertise
but to also provide caretaking of others within the system.
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Power
I believe these hero engineers have special and additional habitus, understanding and
ability to maneuver within the powers in the system. They almost seem to have their own
“power pack” and compass. Recalling Bourdieu’s (1984) theory on the logic of practice that
each individual, or social agent, occupies a multidimensional social space, and the agent is not
only defined by social class, but also by every single kind of capital he or she can accumulate
through social relations. That capital includes the value of social networks, which Bourdieu
showed, could be used to produce or reproduce inequity. Therefore, each agent engages in a
specific complex of social relations in everyday practice or “field.” The agent will develop a
certain disposition, or habitus, for social action that is conditioned by position on the field
(dominant/dominated, orthodox/heterodox, passive/aggressive, etc.). This habitus is then
revealed through the agent’s actions, thoughts, outlooks, and personalities (Bourdieu, 1990a).
The habitus of these heroes was different from others in the system.
Recalling from Chapter 1 that accumulated capital can be leveraged to create power, I
will now present my understanding of the power in the system as related to top management and
our hero engineers. I will leverage Flyvbjerg’s (2008) definition of power as presented in
Chapter 1. He recommends asking the right set of questions to discover the power play in the
system. Though the who, what, and where questions are important, a more revealing and
phronetic point of departure would be questions such as:
1. What are the most immediate and most local power relations operating and how do
they operate?
2. How are the power relations linked together, and according to what logic and
strategy?
3. How do the rationalities support or oppose the power relations?
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4. How can the games of power be played differently?
Since who, what and where is already presented in other chapters, I will provide my
analysis of power for these phronetic the questions. It seems that the immediate and local power
relationships were only superficially influenced by top management’s attempt to consolidate
power. Though personnel were not managed by remote, the work still needed completion. Mel
G, without any direct responsibility, still continued his mentoring and influencing. Work still
was being accomplished within the distributed management system but by local control.
The various powers in the system as linked in a complicated manner. In creating a
distributed management system as a cost savings measure, top management lost their connection
to local control. This void in leadership allowed engineers to seek out experts on their own
rather than through the lines of management. This has led to a happy medium where top
management does not interfere with the actions at the local level.
On the periphery, it seems that new management adversely effected interests of the hero
engineers. However, knowing that both heroes survived and continued their paths regardless of
their charters or their titles shows that the hero engineers may be temporarily impacted but not
adversely affected. The two heroes took different paths after the 2009 reorganization to a
distributed management system. Mark M went on to manage an even larger and more important
project. Mel G continued his influencing, mentoring, and grooming of ACME South engineers
even though that was no longer his assigned task or responsibility; no one has challenged him
since there isn’t anyone else doing the same in the system. Though management could take
away their titles and assigned responsibilities, they did not control the hero engineers who
continued to do their own thing. The new top management was remote and simply not aware of
these or other possible heroes in the system and failed to leverage the available expertise.
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New top management should have managed the system as status quo until they had a
better understanding of the situation. Likewise, it was foolish not to seek out the advice of
experts in the system. Flyvbjerg reminds us that:
“Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that
one hold on to or allows to slip away. Power is exercised rather than
possessed. Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a
complex strategical situation in a particular society.” (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.
117).
This implies that power requires action or exercise; and therefore, more than just ideas
and plans. The distributed management system was set up for the consolidation of top
management power but this was executed without fully understanding our business. The hero
engineers, though not at the same level of power as top management, seemed to have a better
grasp of this concept by their actions towards improving the conditions between the two business
units. Another link between power and action is praxis, the iterative process of reflection and
action, as practiced by our hero engineers. Recalling from Chapter 1, Flyvbjerg (2008) argues
that conscientiousness begets ethical behavior and an expert aims for ethical behavior though
demonstrated conscientiousness and phronesis (applied wisdom). Our hero engineers are
sensitive to the needs of ACME South engineers:
In order to meet our commitments we needed to do a couple of things. We
needed to keep people employed at ACME South. We needed to have solid
work to improve employee morale, keep them entertained, and increase their
knowledge of our products. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
Yes, I have some engineers that need more attention. I have to keep on them
to keep them focused. I provide them extra guidance in cases they are not as
confident in their skills and capabilities. At the same time there are others
that you give the task to and you do not have to worry about them. In any
sort of large sample of people you will run into all sorts. (Mel G, Personal
Interview, 2011).
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[I] learned from the older guys. We had big mil standard books for us to read
and talk about with folks that were experts in them. Though the new
computer tools are very helpful and help productivity, and we have access to
a lot of information, it lacks the exchange of expertise between engineers and
we have to seek that out individually.
The mentoring and apprentice model is still valid today. A lot of the younger
guys do not like to ask. They do not want to admit they do not know
something. Some of us older guys may have forgotten that we should take to
time to explain and keep track of how things are done and going. Learning
through what the older generation has to offer is still a valid way to do things.
(Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
Mark M took this situation as a moral challenge and rather than blaming others, he shows
understanding.
The problem is we have a lot more engineers down there than we need, and
this has caused them to be less motivated since there is not a heavy workload
on them. It does not help that we gave them small, piecemeal work. (Mark
M, Personal Interview, 2011).
Though Mel G does not have any responsibility for ACME South engineers, he still
continues to support them:
They don’t even report to me on the technical side since any more, they have
their project leads from all over the country. I still am somewhat responsible
to making sure they are busy, that everyone is getting attention. Not to get
deeply involved with their detailed work but give them guidance and
direction. Help coordinate with ACME North personnel. (Mel G, Personal
Interview, 2011).

It is not my intent to focus on the folly of top management and the negative nature of
power. I want to demonstrate the complexity of power and how it operates to create selfdetermining structures when there is a void in leadership. Also, power is a process that requires
struggle and confrontations to transform, support, and improve the conditions in the system. To
recall and summarize Flyvbjerg from Chapter 1, for a more comprehensive definition of power,
we must add that power is more than a set of institutions and mechanisms that ensure servile
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[workers]; more than a form of subordination which instead of violence, sets rules; and more
than the general system of domination that one group exercise over another. This expanded view
defines power in terms of force relations, which are not only unstable but also pliable (Flyvbjerg,
2008). This allows us to comprehend the complexity of the power in the system and identify
leadership opportunities at the macro level that our hero engineers are able to recognize and
leverage.
Real Change in power requires changing ourselves, our bodies, our souls, and
our ways of knowledge. It requires “work of the self upon the self.”
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 122).
Overall, the behavior of the hero engineers seems to be based on their understanding of
the plasticity of the system. Where most see a rigid, impermeable, and opaque system, they are
able to identify where the system is flexible, open, and transparent; allowing them to act
accordingly.
Professional Reputation
Both Mark M and Mel G are considered experts in their field of defense engineering
when applying Flyvbjerg’s human-learning process model. They demonstrated the ability to
intuitively, holistically, and judiciously understand the situations, develop solutions, and take
personal actions (Flyvbjerg, 2008). Mel G is recognized as an expert by Barry O:
Mel G. has been the savior for ACME South in my opinion. He would have
probably left or retired if he did not feel that he was needed and doing an
important job of keeping things moving there. I think if Mel G was to leave,
things would get bad pretty quickly and management would probably look
towards making major changes that would affect many engineers at ACME
South.
People trust Mel G and turn to him to review their work and provide
leadership. The interesting thing is that he is one of us (a former ACME
North employee). There is a trust thing in that he [is] a competent engineer
and knows how to do things right. Mel G also knows our standards and
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expectations that he can teach to others there. (Barry O, Personal Interview,
2011).
Both Mel G and Mark M also seem to have a good grasp of what it takes to be an
“expert” engineer.
Successful engineering is a learned process that is built up over time and
cannot just come into existence just because we put some people together in
a building. (Mark M, Personal Interview, 2011).
I also think that engineering is not an 8 to 5 job. In order to be good at it, you
have to constantly reach beyond your capabilities.
The skills that younger folks seem to lack is to make sure they have really
investigated all option rather than taking the first idea that comes up. You
have to research it and do a trade solution rather than a point solution. Make
sure you really look at things in detail. I am not looking for a quick answer; I
am looking for the right answer. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
When analyzing using Goffman’s (1961) professional reputation, both hero engineers
underwent the experiences listed in Figure 4 (see Figure 4). I will examine each of these
experiences:
1. Mark M also knew that he could not accomplish this by himself and recruited Mel G,
who already had started bridging the gap between the two business units on his own.
It was a smart move on both their parts to team up because it provided for a
permanent liaison at ACME South who had a good reputation at both locations, and
the experience of a seasoned engineer.
I went to ACME South to work [on an Army Programs project]. Was
there for a year and a half for that task and when the time came for me to
come back, I was approached by Mark M, program manager for
[Catapult] to take a job with him and remain at ACME South. So I have
been there ever since. (Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
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2. They both experienced unjust deprivation by experiencing the humiliating loss of
responsibilities and titles. Rather than recognition for their hard work, sacrifice, and
accomplishments, they were demoted and marginalized.
3.

Their work was complementary to others in the system because they were doing the
work others could not do nor wanted to do.

4. Both were left with feelings of guilt and without fulfillment since they were not able
to complete what they had started in motion. When recently asked to reflect on their
experiences both had overcome their initial disappointments and said they had moved
on. Both implied it was a temporary setback and that they had moved on to bigger
and better things. Mark M saw it as a blessing since he would not have had the
opportunity to bring in a new, large program to the company if he was still in charge
of the ACME South engineering team. He joked that in his new capacity he can send
them more work than ACME South could handle. Likewise, with Mel G as the lead
manufacturing liaison at ACME South, he was able to identify various production
programs that could be co-located to ACME South to further establish ACME South
as the production center for ACME. Over time, both have landed on their feet and in
a more advanced leadership position.
5. Their reflections on what has happened over the past few years during the interviews
shows that despite the disappointments, they were glad for what they accomplished.
Both have now moved on. After a few years of going back to his sole responsibility,
Mark M is now also the lead engineering manager for a very large program. This is a
brand new, high potential program that would require over 200 new engineers and
long-term viability. Likewise, Mel G remains at ACME South and now manages all
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production support at ACME South and continues to provide leadership to ACME
South engineers. More and more products are now produced at ACME South.
6. Both experienced abandonment by their coworkers and managers. When the new
organization was being proposed, AMCE North top management failed to protect
Mark M and Mel G.
7. Due to the nature of their work, neither was able to hide much about themselves. In
their interviews I found them to be authentic and what-you-see-is-what-you-get.
Though they were “old-school,” opinionated, and hard-driving they were highly
respected and sought-out for advice.
8. For both, this experience was one progression in the “cycle of alienation and
mortification” that has allowed them to learn from their experiences, re-create
themselves, and to continue to seek out more opportunities for themselves and others.
This is adding to their phronesis (practical wisdom).
According to Goffman (1961) professional reputation in is not a property of the person to
whom it is attributed, but dwells rather in the pattern of social control that is exerted in
connection with the person by himself and those around him. The social control is very evident
in what Mel G said about his career at ACME; despite this setback, he stays his own course and
continues to thrive. He has been in the business long enough to understand change is constant
and sooner or later bad or counter-productive decisions are usually reversed.
In my case the opportunities found me through my hard work; I do not go
searching for the next big thing. I think if I did [my] job right, the
opportunities will come. Rise to the top by doing my very best not just
shuttling around form one job to the other for advancement reasons.
(Mel G, Personal Interview, 2011).
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Personal Reflection
I have a renewed admiration for Mark M and Mel G for their desires and actions to
improve the system. They embody phronesis as defined by Flybjerg (2008), have the moral
careers or professional reputations as defined by Goffman (1961), and have the honor and the
dispositions that emphasize duty and execution of that duty as described by Bourdieu (1997).
Though phronesis is not a generally recognized part of engineering, Mark M and Mel G have
applied wisdom.
Mark M and Mel G were able to transcend their professional careers at ACME North and
take on the challenges at ACME South. Many of the realizations identified by Goffman (1961)
as pertaining to one’s professional reputation were experienced by Mark M and Mel G. Both
had solid professional reputations to begin with and quickly grasped the new reality of the
ACME North and ACME South merger. They were better able to see the opportunities and act
accordingly. These challenges added to their experiences and increased their professional
reputations in the long run as indicated by their new roles and leadership positions with increased
responsibility. Mark M and Mel G are examples where they have done the right things despite
obstacles, disappointments, and humiliations.
One very important lesson that I take from this study is that leadership is ultimately about
other people. Though engineering may be seeped in scientific thought and technical execution, it
is a human endeavor fraught with issues often only resolved by phronesis.
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
This research was to understand the relationship between two business units within
ACME Corporation. However, this relationship turned out to be a perfect platform for
investigating the phronetic actions by two hero engineers in the system. It also gave me an
opportunity to document the history and the condition of the defense industry. Having done this
research, I have a greater appreciation and understanding of the complexity of business
relationships, leadership, and phronesis. I very much enjoyed conducting this case study and
learned more about myself, other defense engineers, and the industry in which I work. I also
discovered that experience is necessary in developing one’s professional reputation, and that I
have a ways to go, as I continue to develop my professional reputation and phronesis (practical
wisdom).
The behavior of the unsung hero engineers allows us to recognize that engineering is a
profound human endeavor and a social activity. Their primary focus was the care-taking,
growth, and well-being of the people in the system. It almost seems that the heroes look at
engineers as a protected species.
Findings
This is a typical defense industry story. There are no villains but many heroes in this case
study. The two unsung hero engineers experienced the various pitfalls on their path to a
professional reputation as described by Goffman (1961) and underwent the experiences provided
in Figure 4 (see Figure 4). These experiences included unjust deprivations, uncompleted tasks,
being let-down by others, feelings of isolation, and having one’s fitness questioned and judged.
These hardworking heroes got “kicked in the teeth”, lost their prestige and were marginalized by
management and the changing environment. During the much reorganization, they got lost in the
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shuffle. In the long run, both were able to move on to better positions with more responsibilities
– they persevered.
The two heroes were concerned about the people in the system and focused on a human,
and not a technical, solution to resolve the conflicts between the two business units. This
demonstrated leadership. Regardless of the changes in the organization and loss of their titles
and responsibilities, they continued to do their work, their influencing, and their guiding. They
remain unsung for their contributions to ACME South.
Implications for the Pentagon and Congress
The defense industry, as a complex government-business structure, begs for
simplification and new management tactics. The main implication of this study for the Pentagon
is that each defense program is unique in implementation and needs, and therefore requires
management flexibility to successfully bring these programs to fruition. Present day cookiecutter management methods and a generic acquisition process do not seem to work. As
discussed in chapter 1, New Public Management, sometimes termed as New Government
Management, tactics would benefit Pentagon and the defense industry in this decreased funding
environment. This doctrine differs from the traditional military-bureaucratic ideas of ‘good
management’ in that it requires professional, competent, and experienced management,
elimination of duplication, and streamlining of bureaucracy.
For the Pentagon, the overall NPM doctrine calls for a more professional management
team with explicit standards, measurable performance, and a greater emphasis on output control.
Hood (1991) recommends systematically reducing incompatible objectives. The fewer the
objectives, the easier it would be to identify and remove fat. One set of conflicting objectives for
the defense industry is cheaper products and advanced technology. Likewise, Pentagon’s
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involvement in the process and the end-product is another conflicting set of objectives that would
benefit from simplification. NPM, as shown in Table 2 (see Table 2), expresses that Sigma-type
organizations benefit when they focus on the output rather than on process or input. This would
imply more Pentagon programs should be structured with output in mind than overloading the
industry with regulations that promote costly and non-value-added processes and methodologies.
Pentagon’s aim to cut costs and do more-for-less can be achieved by implementing NPMoriented, highly-competent management and a restructured organization. I am hoping that the
ongoing cost cutting measures will drag the system towards such restructuring. Hood (1991) and
Kaboolian (1998) also provide additional ideas for implementing NPM. These include:


Decentralize by authority by splitting the organization into smaller more fragmented
parts.



Established measures of performance for Pentagon and the defense industry.



Increase competition between different government agencies and private firms.



Set incentives to outcomes and implement performance based contracting.



Set policies from service/product delivery.



Deregulate to allow more participation.



Incentivize greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Kaboolian (1998) argues that government agencies reflect
politics - and therefore the health and improvement - of the current administration. For Congress
and the Executive Branch, the focus should be to improve the system and effectiveness by
implementing meaningful changes to the underlying politics that shifts the Pentagon’s role
towards a more customer orientation. Congress should also legislate for a balanced approach to
defense industry capabilities and the Pentagon’s needs for management and technical experts.
The ideas of phronesis presented here should also apply to the Pentagon. Additionally, Congress
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should recognize that the defense industry is not part of our free market system and to continue
to apply a free-market lens, such as efficiency and low-cost, to evaluate and manage the system
is futile.
Implications for Defense Companies
Defense companies have some similarities to a total institution. A defense company can
be a total institution if top management makes unilateral decisions without regard to others or
impacts to the long-term viability of the business. These “bone-headed” moves such as
enforcing large numbers of policies and processes seems more to ratify management positions
rather than corporate goals, meaningful control, and employee caretaking. In the long run, this
can add bureaucracy, costs, and loss of talent that may limit future business.
A company’s corporate habitus should be kept malleable in order to not only withstand
the chaos in the defense business but to also allow for new structures into the systems that will be
integrated into the corporate habitus over time.
Top management should do more to identify, recognize, and leverage their heroes. This
is even more important when considering buyouts, mergers, and acquisitions. Rather than
outright changing management personnel and management structures, it would be more prudent
to investigate what is going well and identifying the heroes in the system prior to implementing
changes.
Phronetic action should also be expected from top management and on down. This
includes the consideration of possible outcomes prior to action. From my personal experience
with various mergers and acquisitions, the more successful ones provided for a good blend in
new and existing leadership to take the business forward. When re-organizing, be mindful of the
various less tangible factors such as cultural and business conditions.
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Management and technical employees should be encouraged to develop a “whole-mind”
thinking that is in line with phronesis. This includes providing mentorship programs and
opportunities to develop people skills through exposure to subjects such as ethics, art,
psychology, awareness and other social sciences.
Implications for Defense Engineers and Potential Heroes
Defense engineers may have to develop a professional reputation, or moral career, in
order to survive (and thrive) in the system. Simply, praxis (reflective action) and time spent at
one’s place of work will help in creating one’s self that will contribute to one’s professional
reputation but one will have to progress through the Dreyfus and Dreyfus Human Learning
Process Model, as presented in Table 3 (see Table 3). This implies that when coming into a new
system, one will have to start as a novice and progress towards an “expert” by accumulating
experiences and developing additional capabilities.
Defense engineers should also anticipate hardship and “humiliations” which, in the long
run, contributes to their better knowing the system and learning their craft. Defense engineers
should expect to go through the following moral career experiences (also see Figure 4) as they
develop their professional reputation.
1. One needs to reach out for the help of others in getting work done and that this shared
work is for mutual benefits.
2. Some work may be considered “unjust deprivation.” This is the mundane, non-value
added, time wasting, and personally humiliating work.
3. One’s role should be complementary to others on the team.
4. One may not be able to complete all and this may lead to feelings of guilt.
5. One’s recognized-self rises through the view one constructs when looking backwards
over one’s progress (creation of the peculiarly retroactive character).
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6. One may be deserted, abandoned, or sacrificed by one’s coworkers (the idea of letting
go of bad or divergent personal bonds and creating new bonds as one moves on).
7. One cannot hide too much about oneself from others in the system and that one’s
work history is often revealed to others when successful outcomes are re-used and
one’s advice is sought, or on the other side, when others have to clean up one’s past
mistakes and marginal work. Plus, there is talk and gossip in the system.
8. Cycles of alienation and mortification (humiliation) allow for new sets of beliefs and
opportunities to reconceive a self.
Both our heroes did not see themselves as heroes; this may be a qualifying factor. Both
did what they thought as right and not for the desire to be heroes or to be recognized as heroes.
This possibly implies that if you aim to be a hero for the recognition and adulation, you will
more likely miss your mark.
It is also very likely that most heroes are not recognized. Though our two heroes were
able to bounce back, there is also no guarantee that all heroes bounce back. Finally, defense
engineers should balance their technical capabilities with social science knowledge to help
develop phronesis. This case study has taught me that heroes:


Demonstrate leadership. They feel responsibility towards others. Though other may
call this moral action, I’m not sure they see any difference between acting morally
and their everyday actions.



Have a unique habitus (characteristics) that allows them to see the plasticity of the
system.



Are experts and apply phronesis. This allows them to intuitively navigate the system.



Have built sufficient social, cultural and symbolic capital to make things happen.



Have experienced hardship and setbacks.



Work hard and are tenacious.
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Practice humbleness and are life-long learners.



Don’t see themselves as heroes.
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Further Research
The scope of this case study was limited to the phronetic behavior of two hero engineers
with the relationship between the two business units as the background. I would like to
incorporate the experiences of other ACME business units and find other hero engineers in the
system. This method of qualitative inquiry could then be used to identify future leaders. I am
also interested in extending this study to other corporations. Here are some possible areas for
further study:
1. The hero engineers provide an alternate leadership to management. I would like to
investigate if this is a unique finding at ACME or that unsung heroes are common to
other fields.
2. Having found that the defense industry is not part of our free market, I am interested
in identifying other sectors of our economy that are also closed-market systems. It
would be interesting to discover what percentage of our GDP is from these industries.
3. I would also like to broaden the study of professional reputation to better
understanding individuals who rise above the rest and are able to see the opportunities
to enfranchise others. These folks seem to have a unique drive and purpose that is
worthy of study.
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